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MS. SCHAFFER-GOLDMAN:
Hello, everyone. As many of you know, I am Regina SchafferGoldman, and I am the Editor-in-Chief of the IPLJ.
I would like to welcome you to our second panel today. I just
wanted to remind you that the IPLJ is currently publishing its 20th
Volume this year. Past IPLJ issues are available outside on the
desk. Please feel free to take one. The transcript of the
symposium will be published in our third book, due out in the
Spring of 2010.
A PDF version of this Transcript is available online at http://iplj.net/blog/archives/
volumexx/book3. Visit http://iplj.net/blog/archives for access to the IPLJ archive.
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Our second panel will examine “The Global Contours of IP
Protection for Trade Dress, Industrial Design, Applied Art and
Product Configuration.” I am so pleased to introduce our
moderator for this panel, Susan Scafidi.
Susan Scafidi is a visiting Professor of Law at Brooklyn Law
School, where she teaches fashion law, property, and trust and
estates. Professor Scafidi has also taught a course on IP and design
and was very recently here at Fordham. She is also the first law
professor in the U.S. to teach a course on fashion law. In addition,
she is the author of the inimitable blog “Counterfeit Chic,” with
which many Fordham fans are familiar. Thank you so much for
being here, Professor Scafidi.
PROF. SCAFIDI:
Regina, thank you so much for that kind introduction. Also,
thanks to you and to Emily and to all of the members of the Journal
for organizing this tremendous symposium.
Just a few quick remarks—former Senator Bill Bradley, who
still holds the record for the highest percentage of accurate free
throws in the history of college basketball, used to say, “It’s that all
important sense of where you are.” So where we are is as follows:
if we were to start from the premise that IP should all fall under
one umbrella (and of course, not everyone agrees with that, but
that ship has more or less sailed), then an ideal system would look
something like this: a large white public domain and little carveouts for copyright and patent and trademark, each separate and
neatly defined. In fact, of course, the system looks more like a
Venn diagram: everything overlaps a little bit and those boundaries
between copyright and patent and trademark have to be policed in
some fashion.
That’s done in, of course, a number of different ways by using
substantive categorical rules. We know that we move classic
literary and artistic works over to copyright,1 inventions over to
patent and so forth.2 Then we make some additional categorical

1
2

17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(1), (5) (2006); see also id. § 101.
35 U.S.C. § 101.

C03_PANEL_2_FINAL_05-25-10 (DO NOT DELETE)

2010]

IP PROTECTION FOR DESIGN

5/25/2010 2:43 PM

785

decisions like a statutory decision to put architecture in copyright,3
although it bleeds over into trademark occasionally.
We use descriptive categories as well as substantive categories,
so short phrases for example, don’t belong in copyright, but do
belong in trademark if they meet other qualifications.4
Then we use doctrinal means to police those boundaries,
including our primary topic for today, and that is functionality. Of
course we are still dealing with, in this panel and other ways, that
grey area in the middle. What is in the middle of the diagram, at
the point where copyright, patent, and trademark overlap? If you
approach it from copyright, you’ll think of it in terms of applied
art.
If you approach it from patents, you’ll think in terms of
industrial design. If you approach it from trademark, you’ll think
in terms of trade dress. Perhaps if you’re from a system not our
own, outside the U.S., you’ll think of it as a fourth category and
just call it design.
Either way, it’s one of the most fascinating areas of IP, not
least because it’s the little loose strand that if you pull, could tear
the entire system apart, which is why we have a distinguished
panel here today to answer these questions, and to explore,
particularly, how functionality works in all of these areas.
So let me begin by introducing our first panelist. I will
introduce them not all at once, but successively before each speaks,
just in case someone comes in later and isn’t sure whom they’re
listening to.
Starting with Professor Afori, Orit Fischman Afori—you have
the official bio. So let’s make this a little more fun. She gets the
award for coming to us from the furthest. She flew all the way
from Israel just for the weekend to come to our symposium.
She teaches at the College of Management and Academic
Studies Law School in Israel, offering a variety of courses:
corporate law, copyright law, introduction to intellectual property,

3
4

17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(8).
See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. §§ 1052, 1125.
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and a clinical seminar on intellectual property and law and
technology.
She has wonderful interests within IP, including an area that
I’m especially interested in, cultural rights as human rights. But
perhaps most important of all, I learned last night that Orit is such
a brilliant teacher that her two children, ages eight and five,
regularly debate copyright issues. So with that, let me give you
Orit.
PROF. FISCHMAN AFORI:
First, I would like to thank the organizers for inviting me. It’s
a great pleasure for me to be here. The question in this symposium
is a very problematic one, the functionality threshold. My talk will
focus on the function of the non-functionality requirement in
industrial design law and, more specifically, on the confusion it
creates.
Industrial design law protects the appearance of useful articles.
A key requirement for eligibility is that only the non-functional
features of the design will be protected.5 The basic justification for
the non-functionality requirement in design law is to avoid
undermining the provisions of patent law, which under certain
strict conditions, protects functional elements.6
However, the reality is that it is extremely difficult to
implement the non-functionality requirement in practice. After a
very short overview of the requirement in American and English
law, the student-oriented part, I’ll present what are, in my opinion,
the three major reasons for the difficulties in applying the nonfunctionality requirement. I will conclude by proposing a way to
ease the difficulties while maintaining the requirements.
The Non-Functionality Requirement in Current Law
In the U.S., there are currently three major legal paths for
protecting industrial designs: copyright law, trademark law, and
patent law. Each of the three paths provides protection only for the
non-functional features.
5

35 U.S.C. § 171; L.A. Gear, Inc. v. Thorn McAn Shoe Co., 988 F.2d 1117, 1123
(Fed. Cir. 1993); DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS § 1.04(5)–(6) (2005).
6
35 U.S.C. § 112.
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As to copyright, currently the U.S. Act allows protection of
designs by including “applied art” in the subject matter,7 and
including the requirement that the protected features are the nonfunctional ones. Both the copyright office and the courts have
adopted the (impossible) “separability” concept in the application
of the non-functionality doctrine.8
This concept not only prohibits protection of functional
features, but also requires that those non-functional protected
features are separated from the functional ones.9 The problematic
outcome is that non-functional features that are not separated from
the functional ones are actually deprived of protection.10
As a result, U.S. courts have developed doctrines that are
aimed to ease this outcome. These doctrines in turn have been
criticized as making the separability criterion unclear, impossible
to carry out, arbitrary, and subject to manipulations.11
As to the second path—the patent design right—its purpose
was to fill the gap between copyright and patent protection. To
this end, an additional “ornamentality” requirement was added to
the design patent right.12 At the same time, the utility requirement,
which is compulsory with respect to regular patents, was

7

17 U.S.C. § 101.
See id. (“[T]he design of a useful article, as defined in this section, shall be
considered pictorial, graphic, or sculptural work only if, and only to the extent that, such
design incorporates pictorial, graphic, or sculptural features that can be identified
separately from, and are capable of existing independently of, the utilitarian aspect of the
article.”).
9
Id.; see also Kieselstein-Cord v. Accessories by Pearl, Inc., 632 F.2d 989, 993 (2d
Cir. 1980) (describing the conceptual separability test); Esquire, Inc. v. Ringer, 591 F.2d
796, 801–05 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (describing the physical separability test).
10
See, e.g., Brandir Int’l v. Cascade Pac. Lumber Co., 834 F.2d 1142, 1147–48 (2d
Cir. 1987) (explaining that the bicycle rack lost its protections because it combines both
function and aesthetics); see also MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON
COPYRIGHT § 2.08(B)(3) (2005).
11
See PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT, PRINCIPLES, LAW AND PRACTICE § 2.5.3(c) (Little,
Brown and Co. 1989); NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 10, § 2.08(B)(3); J.H. Reichman,
Design Protection After the Copyright Act of 1976: A Comparative View of the Emerging
Interim Models, 31 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y 267, 350–65 (1983); Eric Setliff, Copyright and
Industrial Design: An “Alternative Design” Alternative, 30 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 49, 63
(2006).
12
35 U.S.C. § 171.
8
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eliminated for design patents.13 Consequently, design patents
protect only the ornamental aspects of the patented design, and not
the functional features or aspects.14
The third path for protecting designs in the U.S. is through
trademark law by a trade dress claim. An important requirement
for protection of trademark in general is that it does not contain
functional elements.15
The non-functionality requirement,
therefore, also applies to trade dress cases.16
Things are more complicated when we turn to review the
protection of industrial designs in England because there are
currently five paths for protecting designs, which include three
national paths and two E.U. paths.
In all five paths in England, the basic principle of no protection
of functional features governs. To keep this brief, I would just like
to mention that Article 7(1) of the European Design Directive
provides that “A design right shall not subsist in features of
appearance of a product which are solely dictated by its technical
function”17 and in the following I will relate to this “solely
dictated” test.
Similar provisions forbidding protection of
functional elements have been introduced into national legislation.
To sum up the student oriented part, a key requirement for
design eligibility is that there is no protection for functional
elements. However, there are considerable difficulties in applying
this rule in practice.
Why Applying the Non-functionality Requirement Is Difficult
The application of the non-functionality requirement creates
many difficulties. I would like to offer three major reasons for
this, all of which are linked to the difficulty in defining the term
“functionality.”
13

Id.
Id.; see also CHISUM, supra note 5, § 23.08.
15
15 U.S.C. § 1052(e)(5); see also Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159,
165 (1995) (“‘[A] product feature is functional’ . . . ‘if it is essential to the use or purpose
of the article or if it affects the cost or quality of the article’” (quoting Inwood Labs., Inc.
v. Ives Labs., Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 850 n.10 (1982))).
16
Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 769 (1992).
17
Council Directive 98/71, art. 7(1), 1998 O.J. (L 289) 31 (EC).
14
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The first question that should be asked is how to define “nonfunctional designs.” “Functional” is an abstract term that can be
defined in a number of ways. As I mentioned before, the European
test is whether the design is solely dictated by its technical
function.18
At first glance, this appears to be a very good and helpful
definition for a test for functional designs. A functional design is a
design which is solely dictated by its technical function.19
However, a closer look reveals the fundamental problem: when
can we conclude that a design meets the requirement of “solely
dictated by technical requirement?”
If an article can be formed in several shapes, but in all other
respects is entirely functional, would it be correct to say that its
design is solely dictated by functional considerations?
The problem with these kinds of situations is that since there
are several effective options for shaping the article, the choice of
the actual design must be done on the basis of considerations that
are not purely technical, such as an aesthetic consideration.
For example, look at the illustration of the coffee machines.
There are many functional designs for a coffee machine. On which
basis does a designer make his choice? All of the designs are
functional. Therefore, the choice is made according to aesthetic
considerations, or other considerations which are not necessarily
functional.
The House of Lords debated this issue in the well-known
Amp20 case and concluded that “solely dictated” by technical
functional features means that “the designer was adopting a shape
for the article only according to the question whether it works that
way, without considering whether it appeals to the eye.”21
However, it does not mean, the House of Lords continues, that
there are no other pure, technically-functional possible designs for
the same article.22
18
19
20
21
22

See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
Amp, Inc. v. Utilux Pty Ltd, [1971] F.S.R. 572 (H.L.) (U.K.).
See id. at 583.
See id.
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In other words, this test is the subjective-intent-of-a-designer
test, which, like all subjective tests, is very weak. It is very weak
because of the obvious problem of how a court is supposed to
determine what the designer really had in mind: functional
considerations or aesthetic ones.
The subjective intent test calls for manipulations, which may
result in arbitrary decisions. More to the point, however, it is not
clear why the private intent of the designer is relevant to the
rationale of the legal requirement.
Therefore, I think, it’s clear that there is a need for an objective
test which would serve the rationale of the non-functionality
requirement. Actually, Lord Reid himself admitted in the Amp
case that the ambiguity and the controversy over the eligibility of
designs for protection “are centered around the word ‘dictated,’
which is a metaphorical word out of place in a statutory
definition.”23
The second reason why applying the non-functionality
requirement is difficult is that many contemporary designs
combine functional and aesthetical elements and it is impossible to
separate between the two.
These designs follow the “Form-Follows-Function” (F3)
school, which originated in the ’20s.24 This school still dominates
design to this day.25
The question then becomes whether such design, which merges
functional and aesthetical features, should be deprived of
protection entirely. The answer to this question under the
American separability test is yes:26 no protection is provided to

23

Id. at 578.
See Setliff, supra note 11, at 62 (“According to this Functionalist philosophy, the
usual character of any product was best determined by the internal logic of its
construction and mechanism.” (internal quotations omitted)).
25
An example of a contemporary design which follows the “form-follows-function”
philosophy is Philippe Starck’s lemon press “Juicy Salif,” produced by Alessi in 1990.
See Posting of Angie to Introduction to Design, Philippe Starck—Juicy Salif,
http://introtodesign.blogspot.com/2008/06/philippe-starck-juicy-salif.html (June 24,
2008). Other examples are the many registered designs for chairs. See, e.g., U.S. Patent
No. D514,835 (filed Jan. 19, 2005) (issued Feb. 14, 2006).
26
See NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 10, § 2.08(B)(3).
24
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ornamental features if they are merged into the functional features
of the design.27 (And maybe by this way, the whole American
industry is pushed into the style of separate ornamental features
attached to articles. In other words, there is a legal basis for
American kitsch.)
By contrast, under the English model, registration of design
that had a functional purpose is permitted.28 Nevertheless, this
English model suffers from drawbacks too, because courts have
limited the ability to register these kinds of merged designs if they
“impose restrictions on the freedom of subsequent designers by
leaving no room for alternative designs of the same article.”29
Therefore, there is no legal certainty with respect to the
eligibility of a design, because whether a design imposes
restrictions on the freedom of subsequent designers is not a simple
question to answer.
A third difficulty in applying the non-functionality requirement
is that the meaning of the term “function” is itself less than clear.
One way to understand the term “functional” is in a narrow sense
of “technical function” or “physical function;” this is the English
way of interpretation according to the Design Directive.30
In a broader sense, function may be understood as a way for
achieving an aim.31
If we accept the broader definition of function, then we must
ask what the difference between function and aesthetic is. This is
because under the broad definition, aesthetic may be perceived as a
function. Aesthetic contributes something real to the product,
justifying the consumer’s decision to buy it. Why does a consumer
27

See Jonathan E. Moskin, The Shape of Things to Come—Emerging Theories of
Design Protection, 92 TRADEMARK REP. 691, 694 (2002); see also Bonito Boats, Inc. v.
Thundercraft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 148 (1989).
28
See In re Wingate’s Registered Design, (1935) 52 R.P.C. 126, 131 (Ch.) (U.K.)
(“[S]o long as the design, qua design, is something which makes an appeal to the eye and
is new or original, it is properly a subject matter of registration . . . notwithstanding that it
also involves a method of construction which may be entitled to protection as a patent.”).
29
See Council Directive 98/71, art. 7(2), 1998 O.J. (L 289) 31 (EC).
30
See id.
31
See Merriam-Webster Online, Function, http://www.merriam-webster.com/
dictionary/function (last visited Apr. 13, 2010) (stating that function is synonymous with
“purpose”).
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buy a certain belt or a certain handbag? Because they like it!
Therefore, aesthetics themselves have a function.
If this is the case, then the entire structure of industrial design
protection, in which we protect external appearance but not
function, collapses. I think that this theoretical inquiry into the
term functionality is found in the development of the trade dress
claim in the U.S.
Courts have developed a very sophisticated concept of
aesthetic functionality. Whereas strict functionality examines
whether the dress adds something to the use of the article (this is
the utilitarian functionality),32 aesthetic functionality examines
whether the dress makes the article more appealing to the public
through its appearance.33 However, in 2001, the Supreme Court
somewhat narrowed this doctrine in the TrafFix34 case by
explaining that the aesthetic and the utilitarian aspects must be
distinguished from each other.35
This third difficulty can be resolved by defining “function”
narrowly. However, the first and second difficulties are still
relevant.
It is very hard to distinguish between technical and other
considerations which dictate the design. And, on many occasions,
aesthetics merge with the functional or technical features.
These difficulties create confusion, or “disorder” in industrial
design law, because we must follow the non-functionality
requirement, even though in many cases it does not make any
sense.

32
L.A. Gear, Inc. v. Thorn McAn Shoe Co., 988 F.2d 1117, 1123 (Fed. Cir. 1993)
(“An article of manufacture necessarily serves a utilitarian purpose, and the design of a
useful article is deemed to be functional when the appearance of the claimed design is
dictated by the use or purpose of the article.”).
33
RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 742 cmt. a (1938) (“When goods are bought
largely for their aesthetic value, their features may be functional because they definitely
contribute to that value and thus aid the performance of an object for which the goods are
intended.” (internal citations omitted)).
34
TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Mktg. Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23 (2001).
35
Id. at 33.
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Solutions
It is clear that it is not possible to drop the non-functionality
requirement because it is essential. The question is whether there
is a way to ease this confusion?
My proposal is a very pragmatic one. Since it is impossible to
define accurately when a design is purely functional, and since the
problem of designs that combine both function and aesthetics is an
urgent one, it might make more sense not to resolve the problem at
the registration stage but rather to postpone it to a later stage when
the case of infringement is brought before a court.
Thus, where a design raises the question of functionality and
the answer is not clear cut, the design will nonetheless be
registered. However, the determination of which features of the
design are being protected will be made by a court in the context of
a specific infringement claim.
There are some very significant advantages to this method I’m
proposing. First, registration of partially functional designs will
not hinder innovative or creative efforts since registration can
always be challenged in court. It is a known fact that there is no
real prosecution of designs. Actually, designs are deposited during
registration.
I suggest simply adding a reservation concerning a possible
functionality problem when a design is deposited. This proposal
has the advantage of allowing challenges to the eligibility of
registered IP rights at all stages. This is usually done by a
competitor in an indirect way by just using the design and
subsequently facing an infringement action.
Another advantage of this proposal is that there are difficulties
in defining the threshold of eligibility. The question is ultimately
the eye-of-the-judge test. The eye-of-the-judge test is arbitrary by
nature. Therefore, it is better to shift the exercise of the test to the
specific context of a court case between actual parties. Such a
case-by-case resolution is the traditional common law way of
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doing things36 and is less disruptive than an advanced
determination of eligibility with respect to property rights.
The common law system already contains a mechanism which
calls for shifting complicated decisions, which are derived from
factual bases, to court. This pragmatic approach should be used in
the industrial design realm as well.
Mainly, the non-functionality requirement should function as
an open-standard norm similar to originality,37 substantial
similarity,38 and other open-standard norms. When these standards
are actually employed, it is impossible to impose a single rule to
cover a limitless range of factual possibilities.
Another advantage of this proposal is that courts are in a better
position to hear evidence prior to deciding whether granting
protection in a specific case would close off practical alternatives
for future designers. In other words, the decision whether a feature
is functional or not would be made on a practical rather than a
theoretical basis based on evidence and actual data presented in
court.
Finally, the most important advantage of this proposal is that it
has the merit of eliminating the “all or nothing” consequences of
the non-functionality requirement: the decision is always made in a
specific context of a competing use. Future designers may reopen
the question, leading to a different result in a different case, based
on a new technological development or new factual basis.
These are basically the most sound and robust justifications for
this kind of solution. To conclude, shifting the non-functionality
requirement into an open-standard rule that is determined on a
case-by-case basis, would be a pragmatic solution to this unending
debate over how to apply the non-functionality requirement.

36

See MARTIN HOWE & A.D. RUSSELL-CLARKE, RUSSELL-CLARKE ON INDUSTRIAL
DESIGNS 35–42 (Sweet & Maxwell 2005).
37
See Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345 (1991) (“Original,
as the term is used in copyright, means only that the work was independently created by
the author (as opposed to copied from other works), and that it possesses at least some
minimal degree of creativity.”).
38
See CRAIG JOYCE ET AL., COPYRIGHT LAW 618–21 (7th ed. 2006) (discussing the
various approaches to the “substantial similarity” test).
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Thank you.
PROF. SCAFIDI:
Wendy Gordon, as one of the first ladies of copyright, is truly
one of those people who needs no introduction, but let me do it
anyway, because it’s just so much fun.
For those of you who may not know Wendy Gordon, she is the
Philip S. Beck Professor of Law at Boston University School of
Law. And if you don’t know her, the Supreme Court certainly
does, because she’s been cited in three different opinions. She also
recently completed her second term as Chair of the AALS Section
on IP.
Her interests may begin with copyright, but they extend
throughout the rest of intellectual property, including trademark
and unfair competition and legal theory, etc. She’s even taught a
course on functionality, so we get the microcosm of that today.
Wendy, thank you so much for being here.
PROF. GORDON:
I appreciate that kind introduction. Fordham just seems to
breed generosity of spirit. Thank you, Susan, and thank you to the
organizers of this symposium.
Before beginning, let me mention that I will confine myself to
a limited number of arenas. Thus, for example, I’m not going to
discuss design patents, which will be the focus of another
speaker’s remarks. I will also not discuss the doctrine of aesthetic
functionality. My primary goal will be to compare trademark’s
doctrine of utilitarian “functionality” with copyright’s doctrine of
“separability,” and to show how for at least two circuit court
opinions, the two doctrines may be converging. I hope to stimulate
discussion of whether such convergence would be a good idea.
To do that, I’d initially like to bring you back to 1964, when
the Supreme Court issued its Sears39 and Compco40 decisions. In
these two cases, the Supreme Court ruled that courts could not use
state unfair competition law to enjoin the duplication of useful
39
40

Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225 (1964).
Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234 (1964).
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product designs. In dicta, the Court essentially said that anything
not protected by a federal patent or a federal copyright, but that lies
within the general subject matter of either of those federal laws,
must go into the public domain,41 at least as far as state law is
concerned. After Sears and Compco, it looked like state
trademark-type protection to enjoin the confusing use of sourceidentifying product shapes was being wiped off the map.42
Since then, of course, we’ve seen a lot of developments at the
intersection of these three areas of law, patent, copyright, and
trademark. In particular, we’ve seen increasing use of the Lanham
Act, which, as a federal law, is not subject to preemption the way
the state laws at issue in the Sears-Compco cases were. The
Lanham Act sustained the strength of trade dress law:43 allowing

41

See Compco, 376 U.S. at 237–38; Sears, 376 U.S. at 231.
The Court wrote,
That an article copied from an unpatented article could be made in
some other way, that the design is “nonfunctional” and not essential
to the use of either article, that the configuration of the article copied
may have a “secondary meaning” which identifies the maker to the
trade, or that there may be “confusion” among purchasers as to which
article is which or as to who is the maker, may be relevant evidence
in applying a State’s law requiring such precautions as labeling;
however, and regardless of the copier’s motives, neither these facts
nor any others can furnish a basis for imposing liability for or
prohibiting the actual acts of copying and selling.
Compco, 376 U.S. at 238.
The later Supreme Court case of Bonito Boats, discussed infra, can be read as
rendering ineffective the part of the Compco opinion that disapproved of state
prohibitions against the confusing use of distinctive “nonfunctional” features. See Bonito
Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 166 (1989). Mark Alan Thurmon
argues that after Bonito Boats, “There is no federal right to copy a distinctive, nonfunctional design.” Mark Alan Thurmon, The Rise and Fall of Trademark Law’s
Functionality Doctrine, 56 FLA. L. REV. 243, 313 (2004). However, as Thurmon also
notes, opposing positions are taken by other commentators. Id. at 313 n.316 and sources
cited therein.
43
See, e.g., Jay Dratler, Jr., Trademark Protection for Industrial Designs, 1988 U. ILL.
L. REV. 887, 898–99 (“Although ‘trade dress’ originally referred primarily to packaging,
containers, and labels, in recent years the concept has expanded to cover product
configurations and even the ‘look and feel’ of products and service establishments.”
(footnotes omitted)).
42
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trademark-type protection for distinctive non-functional product
and container shapes.44
Over time, Sears-Compco shrank down even as applied to state
law. For example, state trade secret law was upheld against a
preemption challenge,45 and a California law criminalizing the
duplication of certain sound recordings was upheld against
preemption.46 It became clear that, depending on the context,
states could restrain or punish the copying of at least some
products left unprotected by federal copyright or patent law.
Then the Supreme Court drew on the Lanham Act itself to
refine its pre-emption position. In the 1989 case Bonito Boats,47
the Supreme Court did two things. First, it reasserted that at its
core Sears-Compco was basically correct: that “federal patent laws
do create a federal right to ‘copy and to use’”48 which states may
not abrogate. Accordingly, the Court struck down a Florida statute
that prohibited certain copying of boat hull designs.49 Second, the
Bonito Boats Court went out of its way to say, we don’t mean to
threaten the law of trade dress too much.50
Referring to the federal trademark statute, the Lanham Act, the
Court wrote:
Congress has . . . given federal recognition to many
of the concerns [such as avoiding consumer
confusion] that underlie the state tort of unfair
competition, and the application of Sears and
Compco to nonfunctional aspects of a product
44
See id. Dratler sees “the federalization of trademark law under the Lanham Act” as
having apparently made a “successful end run” around the practical effects that Sears and
Compco might have had on trade dress law. Id. at 923. Nevertheless, as Dratler himself
cautions, the policies of Sears and Compco have been taken into account by cases and
commentators in assessing how the Lanham Act should treat industrial design. Id. at 923–
24.
45
Kewanee v. Bicron, 416 U.S. 470, 474 (1974) (holding Ohio trade secret law was
not preempted by federal patent law).
46
Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 571 (1972) (upholding California statute
against preemption challenge).
47
Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141 (1989).
48
Id. at 165 (emphasis in original).
49
Id. at 144.
50
See id. at 154–56.
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which have been shown to identify source must take
account of competing federal policies in this
regard.51
So Bonito Boats can be read as approving protection for
“nonfunctional” aspects of product design when necessary to avert
consumer confusion—and as assigning to “nonfunctionality” the
role, inter alia, of safeguarding the limits embodied in the patent
system.
Patents are hard to obtain and have a short duration.52 If the
law allowed relatively easy trademark protection through the
accumulation of secondary meaning, or relatively easy copyright
protection through the device of originality, we could end up
trapping functional minor advances not worthy of patent, and
extending rights in such things for the very long term that
copyright gives, or in the case of trademark, potentially forever.
Even for advances that are worthy of patent, it disserves patent law
goals to extend protection beyond the statutory term.53
So consider the guy who’s trying to decide what to do with his
invention. If it’s got a physical shape, he might be saying to
himself, “Well, I don’t want to go the patent route. It’s expensive,
I only get the patent under certain conditions, I’ve got to disclose
my invention, and the whole thing goes into the public domain
after about 20 years.54 If I can figure out some way to give the
product source-identifying significance, or use my originality to
make it pretty enough, let me go the trademark or copyright route,
and I’ll get much longer protection.”

51

Id. at 166 (emphasis added) (making reference to section 43(a) of the Lanham Act
(dicta)). The Bonito Boats Court also reinterpreted Sears as dealing with “the functional
aspects of a product[,]” not mentioning whether it also viewed Compco’s elimination of
the nonfunctional/functional distinction as mere dicta. Id. at 156.
52
35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (2006).
53
See Aronson v. Quick Point Pencil Co., 440 U.S. 257, 262 (1979) (stating that the
purposes of the federal patent system are: “[f]irst, patent law seeks to foster and reward
invention; second, it promotes disclosure of inventions, to stimulate further innovation
and to permit the public to practice the invention once the patent expires; third, the
stringent requirements for patent protection seek to assure that ideas in the public domain
remain there for the free use of the public” (emphasis added)).
54
35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2).
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If that alternate set of routes were relatively easy to use, it
would destroy much of the patent system as it exists. So it’s not
surprising that the Supreme Court in Bonito Boats effectively said
that however whittled away the Sears-Compco cases from 1964
might be, their basic emphasis on preserving the patent system, and
its primacy for the public domain, deserves our attention.55 Nor is
it surprising that the Bonito Boats opinion reserved its approbation
of trade dress for “nonfunctional” shapes.
After Bonito Boats came Dastar.56 There the Supreme Court
addressed how federal trademark fared when it encountered part of
the copyright domain. In Dastar, the Supreme Court gave a
narrow interpretation to the Lanham Act in order to prevent an
end-run around copyright’s rules about the need for public access
to expired copyrights.57
In that case, a public domain film was “copied substantially”58
and repackaged by a third party.59 The third party sold it, which
was perfectly permissible as far as the expired copyright in the film
was concerned.60 Yet lower courts had given the original maker of
the film a trademark cause of action on the grounds known as
reverse passing off: that the repackager had attributed to itself the
efforts of somebody else.61
The Supreme Court stepped in to say, we really must honor the
copyright judgment that this film is in the public domain.62 The
route the Court chose was to narrow the Lanham Act, so that the
word “origin” in section 43(a) applied only to the source of
physical manufacture rather than to the source of ideas.63 The

55

Bonito Boats, 489 U.S. at 156–57.
Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23 (2003).
57
See id. at 33–34.
58
Id. at 28.
59
See id. at 25–26.
60
See id. at 38.
61
Id. at 27–28.
62
Id. at 37–38. The Court wanted to avoid “creat[ing] a species of mutant copyright
law that limits the public’s federal right to ‘copy and to use’ expired copyrights.” Id. at 34
(quotation marks omitted) (citing Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thundercraft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S.
141, 165 (1989)).
63
Id. at 37.
56
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defendant had physically manufactured the films it distributed, so
it was not guilty of reverse passing off.64
Thus we have the Supreme Court in Bonito Boats
reemphasizing the importance of patent, including patent’s limited
duration and high standards that put innovations into the public
domain. We have Dastar, which reinforced the importance of the
copyright public domain. In addition, in the nineteenth century,
the Supreme Court in Baker v. Selden65 made clear that copyright
must defer to patent when useful methods are at issue.66 Copyright
should not grant exclusive rights even in artistic creations67 if the
result might be to lock up a useful method that patent law would
govern or put into the public domain.68 Today’s statute is explicit
64

See id. at 38.
101 U.S. 99 (1879).
66
The refusal to use copyright to grant rights in useful methods could also be
considered an issue of copyright’s own proper internal boundaries. Yet the Court treated
patent law as relevant. Thus, a key issue in Baker was whether “the copyright in a book”
describing a bookkeeping method could restrain strangers from reproducing “the ruled
lines and headings” necessary to employ the bookkeeping system. Id. at 101. The Court
held copyright law gave no such right lest the use of the method itself be constrained.
To give to the author of the book an exclusive property in the art
described therein, when no examination of its novelty has ever been
officially made, would be a surprise and a fraud upon the public.
That is the province of letters-patent, not of copyright. The claim to
an invention or discovery of an art or manufacture must be subjected
to the examination of the Patent Office before an exclusive right
therein can be obtained; and it can only be secured by a patent from
the government.
Id. at 102 (emphasis added).
67
It might be argued that the lines and headings in Baker were insufficiently original
or artistic to be protected by copyright even had there been no trespass on patent’s
territory. I do not pretend to have expertise in 1879 copyright law. Nevertheless, the
Court’s approach does not seem to depend on any finding that the lines and headings
were unoriginal. Rather, the contrast with art per se lay in the purposes art serves. Id. at
103–04. Wrote the Court, inter alia:
where the art [that a book] teaches cannot be used without employing
the methods and diagrams used to illustrate the book, or such as are
similar to them, such methods and diagrams are to be considered as
necessary incidents to the art, and given therewith to the public; not
given for the purpose of publication in other works explanatory of the
art, but for the purpose of practical application.
Id. at 103 (emphasis added).
68
Whether the art might or might not have been patented, is a question
which is not before us. It was not patented, and is open and free to
65
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in disclaiming copyright for methods, ideas, processes and the
like.69
All these decisions have implications for how federal law
should be interpreted, implicitly in Bonito Boats and explicitly in
Baker and Dastar. Dastar suggests that federal trademark law
must sometimes defer to copyright’s definition of the public
domain; Baker posits that copyright must sometimes defer to
patent’s definition of the public domain; and Bonito Boats suggests
that the public has some rights to copy and to use functional
objects and discoveries that are unpatented. What are the courts
and other branches of government doing with these instructions?
Historically, trademark law has assessed a number of factors to
monitor its border with patent; one of the important factors was
whether a given design was a “competitive necessity” in the sense
that few or no equally good alternative designs existed.70 In a few
minutes I will turn to TrafFix, a fairly new Supreme Court opinion
that may drastically reduce the relevance of design alternatives to
trademark law. We are not sure what the future of trademark will
bring.
Let me begin, though, with copyright, and a test it uses to
monitor its border with patent. I will focus on one version of that
test, which does not depend on the availability of “alternative
designs.”
Copyright law refuses to grant exclusive rights to some original
creations potentially within its ambit, in part to secure the primacy
of patent and the patent public domain. Copyright has many
devices for doing so. For purposes of examining industrial design,
the most important of the copyright doctrines is the following rule:
that those pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works that are “useful

the use of the public. And, of course, in using the art, the ruled lines
and headings of accounts must necessarily be used as incident to it.
Id. at 104 (emphasis added).
69
17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2006) (“In no case does copyright protection for an original
work of authorship extend to any idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation,
concept, principle, or discovery, regardless of the form . . . .”).
70
See generally Thurmon, supra note 42.
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objects” can be copyrighted only if their aesthetic aspects are
separable from their utilitarian ones.71
Admittedly, as our prior speaker Orit Fischman Afori says,
“Aesthetics are a kind of function.” The Copyright Act addresses
that issue in its skillful definition of “useful article,” which you’ll
find at section 101.72 A useful article “is an article having an
intrinsic utilitarian function that is not merely to portray the
appearance of the article or to convey information.”73 I’ve
emphasized that last bit because it describes the functions that are
appropriate for copyright. It is perfectly appropriate for copyright
“to portray . . . appearance” or “to convey information.” Those are
copyright functions. A three-dimensional object that solely serves
these functions is not a “useful article.”
By contrast, if a three-dimensional object74 serves additional or
other utilitarian functions, it is a “useful article” and must pass the
separability test in order to obtain copyright protection:
the design of a useful article . . . shall be considered
a . . . sculptural work only if, and only to the extent
that, such design incorporates pictorial, graphic or
sculptural features that can be identified separately
from, and are capable of existing independently of,
the utilitarian aspects of the article.75
The separability test applies if you’re trying to get protection
for a piece of industrial design as a sculptural object and that
design serves—as it almost always does—a function other than
conveying appearance or information. Examples of objects subject
to the separability test would include, for example, the chair or the
coffee makers that Orit presented in her slides, or an ornamental

71

17 U.S.C. § 101 (defining “pictorial graphic, and sculptural works” and “useful
article”).
72
Id. (defining “useful article”).
73
Id. (emphasis added).
74
Such objects (other than buildings, which are subject to separate protection under 17
U.S.C. § 102(a)(8)) usually seek copyright as “sculptural” works, id. § 102(a)(5), and
such works are subject to the separability test if they are “useful articles.”
75
17 U.S.C. § 101 (defining “pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works”).
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belt buckle76 or a visually pleasing bicycle rack.77 These are
“useful articles.” If their creators try to get them protection as
sculptural works, the separability test might well deny them
copyright.
Orit has emphasized the difficulties courts have had in
applying the separability test. Those difficulties and the resulting
variations among courts cannot be denied. But I see my task as
trying to get an overview of separability. One way to achieve that
goal is by focusing on an interpretation of the separability doctrine
that is fairly unambiguous: namely, that copyright should be
granted to an aesthetic feature only if, inter alia, “the useful article
in which [the feature] is embodied would be equally useful without
it.”78 I call this the “shaving-off” test: strip off the aesthetics, and
ask if the object still functions as effectively. A “shaving-off”
interpretation is advanced as a component of a test for conceputal
separability by a noted commentator (Paul Goldstein, from whom I
quote) and is inherent in the analysis of at least one respected court
(the Second Circuit in Carol Barnhart).79

76

See Kieselstein-Cord v. Accessories by Pearl, Inc., 632 F.2d 989, 990 (2d Cir.
1980).
77
See Brandir Int’l, Inc. v. Cascade Pac. Lumber Co., 834 F.2d 1142, 1143 (2d Cir.
1987).
78
This is the second prong of Paul Goldstein’s suggested “distillation” of conceptual
separability: “a pictorial, graphic or sculptural feature incorporated in the design of a
useful article is conceptually separable if it can stand on its own as a work of art
traditionally, conceived, and if the useful article in which it is embodied would be equally
useful without it.” See 1 PAUL GOLDSTEIN, GOLDSTEIN ON COPYRIGHT § 2.5.3, at 2:67 (2d
ed. 2003 & Supp. 2004) (emphasis added). As discussed further infra, the “shave-off”
test is most clearly applied in Carol Barnhart, Inc. v. Economy Cover Corp., 773 F.2d
411, 412 (2d Cir. 1985) (denying mannequin torsos copyright).
The first prong of Goldstein’s test (the work standing on its own as art) is
problematic for many reasons, including its malleability. But since Goldstein’s twoprong test is cumulative (it uses the word “and” between the prongs), a work will fail to
obtain copyright if it fails to meet either of the two prongs. If it fails the second prong,
that is sufficient to bar copyright. The second prong is the one I employ (whether the
object would be equally useful if shaved of its allegedly copyrightable elements). And
that second prong tends to provide relatively unambiguous and predictable results.
In Pivot Point International, Inc. v. Charlene Products, Inc., 372 F.3d 913 (7th Cir.
2004), the Seventh Circuit refused to adopt a variant of the shave-off test, over a vigorous
dissent. See id. at 932–34 (Kanne, J., dissenting). Interestingly, the majority opinion
devotes some attention to the possibility of alternative designs. Id. at 929–30.
79
Carol Barnhart Inc. v. Econ. Cover Corp., 773 F.2d 411 (2d Cir. 1985).

C03_PANEL_2_FINAL_05-25-10 (DO NOT DELETE)

804

FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J.

5/25/2010 2:43 PM

[Vol. 20:783

Admittedly, this test I adapt from Carol Barnhart is not a
majority or even plurality rule. For example, the Second Circuit
itself, in a later case, used a different interpretation of separability,
without rejecting the Barnhart result.80 But for purposes of our
discussion, the shave-off test I offer has many virtues. First, I
think it is consistent with many case results, and sensitive to patent
concerns. Second, it “holds still”: one can make predictions, I
think, about what copyrights it will bar. If one shaves off the
arguably original (aesthetic) features, will the object still function
as well? That’s not usually a hard question to answer. Third, it
offers a striking contrast to historic trademark law, which will help
the clarity of our discussion. The pre-TrafFix functionality test of
trademark law looks to whether an object has alternatives.
Consider a bicycle rack made of undulating tubing that is
aesthetically pleasing in a form-follows-function way. Under the
“shaving-off” test, it could not be copyrighted, because if one
removed its undulations, there would be nothing to which the
bicycles and their locks could attach. Under the “alternatives” test
now so controversial in trademark law, on the other hand, the bike
rack might be “nonfunctional” because so many alternatives exist
to the particular shape.81
I do not argue substantively that the shave-off test is the best
one—I am not even sure Goldstein would say that of his test.82
But for purposes of understanding potential differences between
“functionality” and “separability,” the shave-off test is an excellent
one.
Now that we have temporarily “fixed” part of our interpretation
of separability, we can ask what purposes such a broad prohibition
might serve from an institutional perspective. I don’t mean that
these purposes were embraced by Congress deliberately—the

80

See Brandir, 834 F.2d at 1145.
Thus, in Brandir, the court found a bicycle rack uncopyrightable, but on the question
of trademark functionality, Brandir remanded: “[I]t is the absence of alternative
constructions performing the same function that renders the feature functional” for
trademark purposes, and that was seen as a question of fact not suitable for summary
judgment. Id. at 1148–49. An object could be “inseparable” and noncopyrightable, but
nevertheless “nonfunctional” and capable (if distinctive) of serving as a trademark.
82
See GOLDSTEIN, supra note 78, § 2.5.3, at 2:68–71.
81

C03_PANEL_2_FINAL_05-25-10 (DO NOT DELETE)

2010]

IP PROTECTION FOR DESIGN

5/25/2010 2:43 PM

805

historical record is complex83—but that the purposes may
nevertheless have been served.
Separability if interpreted strictly (that is, using the “shavingoff test”) can be seen as a way of reducing judicial and litigation
costs. It is possible that Congress by adopting the separability test
in 1976 avoided for copyright the morass of what we term in
trademark law the functionality doctrine.84 “Separability” could
allow courts to avoid deciding, for example, whether there are
many competitive alternatives available for a particular lamp
design, or a particular chair design.85 Separability can be
understood as instructing judges to avoid the hard questions: if you
can’t separate the function out, such that the artwork can still exist
afterwards, then just deny copyright to the whole thing. Avoid
complicated questions of how good this particular object is at its
task, whether giving it a copyright will allow sufficient scope to
later designers, or questions about the object’s artistic quality. If
the object doesn’t pass the separability test, the battle’s over. No
copyright.
Thus I’m speculating that in making this choice for
separability, Congress may have enabled an experiment in
reducing litigation and lightening the judicial load. (Whether the
courts took advantage of the opportunity is a separate question.)
83

See, e.g., J.H. Reichman, Design Protection in Domestic and Foreign Copyright
Law: From the Berne Revision of 1948 to the Copyright Act of 1976, 1983 DUKE L.J.
1143, 1259–64 (detailing the interactions that gave rise to the separability test and its
adoption in the 1976 Act).
84
Mark Alan Thurmon describes the 1928–81 developments in trademark
functionality doctrine as “turbulent.” See Thurmon, supra note 42, at 271–82.
85
In fact, when the Copyright Act was passed, the availability of competitive
alternatives looked like it was very important to the trademark test for functionality. The
Copyright Act embodying the separability test was passed in 1976. Copyright Act of
1976, Pub. L. No. 93-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. §§ 101–810,
1101 (2006)). The Morton-Norwich court supplied examples of cases in 1976 and 1973
that emphasized an inquiry into “alternatives” as part of the functionality inquiry in
trademark law. In re Morton-Norwich Prods., Inc., 671 F.2d 1332, 1341 (C.C.P.A. 1982).
The Morton-Norwich opinion also cited some cases in which functionality was found
despite the presence of alternative designs. Id.; see also Thurmon, supra note 42, at 271–
82 (suggesting that the Restatement (First) of Torts in 1938 temporarily pulled trademark
courts away from developing a consensus that functionality should be viewed from the
perspective of “competitive need” in which analysis of alternative designs would have
played an important role).
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The legislative history states that Congress saw a need for a bright
line test; 86 it doesn’t reveal the underlying logic of that choice.
Whatever the explanation, the separability test seems to me on
its face to deny judges an immense amount of discretion. Now as
the courts have actually interpreted separability, they have been
more protective of their powers. Some objects that you might
think didn’t possess separable aesthetic and functional features,
have been granted copyright protection.
But by and large, in my view, the courts have been fairly
restrictive in their grants of copyright—following implicitly some
version of the “shaving-off” test perhaps—and have for example
denied copyright to immensely creative bicycle rack designs87 and
torsos of the human figure being used as store mannequins.88 To
illustrate the strictness of the “separability” approach in practice,
consider architecture.
86

[T]he Committee is seeking to draw as clear a line as possible
between copyrightable works of applied art and uncopyrighted works
of industrial design. A two-dimensional painting, drawing, or
graphic work is still capable of being identified as such when it is
printed on or applied to utilitarian articles such as textile fabrics,
wallpaper, containers, and the like. The same is true when a statue or
carving is used to embellish an industrial product or, as in the Mazer
case [347 U.S. 201 (1954)], is incorporated into a product without
losing its ability to exist independently as a work of art. On the other
hand, although the shape of an industrial product may be
aesthetically satisfying and valuable, the Committee’s intention is not
to offer it copyright protection under the bill. Unless the shape of an
automobile, airplane, ladies’ dress, food processor, television set, or
any other industrial product contains some element that, physically or
conceptually, can be identified as separable from the utilitarian
aspects of that article, the design would not be copyrighted under the
bill.
H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 55 (1976) (emphasis added).
At least one court, however, argues that “[t]he language employed by Congress is
not the language of a bright-line rule of universal application” but rather “general policy
guidance.” Pivot Point Int’l, Inc. v. Charlene Prods., Inc., 372 F.3d 913, 921 (7th Cir.
2004). I think that assessment overstates the indeterminacy of the statute.
87
See Brandir Int’l, Inc. v. Cascade Pac. Lumber Co., 834 F.2d 1142, 1143 (2d Cir.
1987).
88
See Carol Barnhart Inc. v. Econ. Cover Corp., 773 F.2d 411, 412 (2d Cir. 1985)
(denying mannequin torsos copyright). But see Pivot Point, 372 F.3d at 932 (holding that
a mannequin is copyrightable “because [it] was the product of a creative process
unfettered by functional concerns”).
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For some time, buildings were copyrightable only as sculptural
objects, and therefore as “useful articles” had to pass the
separability test. They generally could not pass. Except as to
discrete ornaments like “gargoyles,” “Congress and the courts
refused to acknowledge any separability that would permit
protection for a building itself.”89 “Finished buildings generally
were not considered protected . . . .”90
In order to adhere to the Berne Convention in regard to
architecture, Congress twice amended the Copyright Act. In the
second amendment, Congress gave architecture a new category
free of the strict separability analysis.91 The new test seems to be
whether the “design elements are not functionally required,”92
apparently a test easier for copyright claimants to pass than
separability.
Without the separability rule, product shapes probably could be
protectable to a much greater extent than they are. Perhaps they
would only be struck down if they violated yet another copyright
rule, perhaps the doctrine called “merger.”93 Merger is usually
employed to keep ideas free from copyright protection, but the
general policies of the doctrine apply equally well to functional
objects.94
Merger strikes only rarely. It’s like lightning, whereas a lack
of separability is an everyday occurrence, like rain.
89

JULIE COHEN, LYDIA PALLAS LOREN, RUTH OKEDIJI & MAUREEN O’ROURKE,
COPYRIGHT IN A GLOBAL INFORMATION ECONOMY 269 (2d ed. 2006).
90
Id.
91
See Architectural Works Copyright Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 101-650, §§ 702–06,
104 Stat. 5133 (1990) (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. §§ 101–02, 106, 120, 301).
92
COHEN ET AL., supra note 89, at 276 (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 101-735, at 20–21
(1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6935, 6951–52)).
93
See generally Morrissey v. Procter & Gamble Co., 379 F.2d 675, 678–79 (1st Cir.
1967) (providing general information about the merger doctrine and idea/expression
dichotomy).
94
Thus, at various times courts have used the “idea/expression dichotomy” to deny
copyright protection to three-dimensional objects. See Reichman, supra note 83, at 1234
& n.476.
Merger is not the only alternative. Another approach might be to deny copyright to
objects whose shapes are “functionally required.” See discussion of architectural works
supra text accompanying notes 91–92. Such a test, like merger, is much less demanding
than the separability test—at least on its face.
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The merger doctrine came into being via judicial interpretation
long ago.95 Although you can describe merger in many ways, as it
applies to our concerns the merger doctrine basically would deny
copyright to an expressive work conveying an idea or serving a
functional purpose if giving copyright would threaten to lock up
the idea or function in the copyright holder’s hands.96 That is, a
finding of merger can be precluded by showing there are a
multitude of alternative ways to express the idea or attractively
carry out the function. It resembles the pre-TrafFix “functionality”
inquiry more closely than it does the “shave-off” version of
separability.
Merger is supposed to keep copyright from checkmating the
public’s interest in free use in ideas and unpatented products. The
Morrissey97 court used the word “checkmate” to indicate that a
court should consider a piece of expression “merged” into its idea
before the point is reached when the expression is the sole way of
conveying the idea. Even if there are a few potential alternate
versions possible, copyright should be denied if you can see the
end in sight—much as good chess players can see an inevitable
checkmate several moves ahead of the actual event.98 But not all
courts take the “checkmate” approach.
So merger seems to say, if there are only a few ways of
expressing something, then you can’t copyright any of them. Now
in the case of that beautiful chair that Orit showed, or those someattractive, some-unattractive espresso machines that she showed,
clearly there are more than three or four ways to design them.
Many particular espresso machines or chairs would, I think, pass a
merger test. But they may flunk separability.

95
See Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99, 101–02 (1879). Baker is often seen as the
birthplace of the merger doctrine: “[W]here the art [a book] teaches cannot be used
without employing the methods and diagrams used to illustrate the book, or such as are
similar to them, such methods and diagrams are to be considered as necessary incidents
to the art, and given therewith to the public . . . .” Id. at 103.
96
See generally id. at 101–02 (providing general information about what we now call
the merger doctrine and idea/expression dichotomy); Morrissey, 379 F.2d at 678–79
(same).
97
Morrissey v. Procter & Gamble Co., 379 F.2d 675 (1st Cir. 1967).
98
See id. at 678–79.
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The tests for separability vary across federal jurisdictions. I’d
be glad to discuss the tests in detail during the question and answer
session. For now, let me mention two examples. One type of
approach tracks the creator’s choices in making his design, asking
whether changes were made to the design to serve a functional
purpose.99 If so, it doesn’t matter if the affected feature also shows
aesthetic intent, kill it, no copyright for it.100 The other approach,
which I’ve already mentioned, implicitly asks if the aesthetic part
of the object could be shaved off without impairing the object’s
functionality.101 If it can, then copyright would be sustained. If,
on the other hand, removing the contested features would impair
the object’s functionality, copyright in the features would be
denied.
Because it is often difficult for useful objects of industrial
design to get protection as sculptures under copyright law,102 one
might question whether copyright’s failure to protect most
industrial design causes disincentives. In my view, American
designers still predominantly follow the route of Form-FollowsFunction, instead of trying to pile flowery separable designs on top
99

For example, the court held that a bike rack, which originated as an artistic
sculpture, was functional, and therefore not copyrightable, in part because the sculptor
modified the original sculpture with the intent of making it a more efficient bicycle rack.
See Brandir Int’l, Inc. v. Cascade Pac. Lumber Co., 834 F.2d 1142, 1147–48 (2d Cir.
1987).
100
See id.
101
The Second Circuit in dicta suggested the grant of copyright to a belt buckle design
was appropriate because, inter alia, “the ornamented surfaces of the buckles were not in
any respect required by their utilitarian functions; the artistic and aesthetic features could
. . . be conceived of as having been added to, or superimposed upon, an otherwise
utilitarian article.” Carol Barnhart Inc. v. Econ. Cover Corp., 773 F.2d 411, 419 (2d Cir.
1985) (discussing Kieselstein-Cord v. Accessories by Pearl, Inc., 632 F.2d 989 (2d Cir.
1980)). The opinion concludes by defending the copyright in the belt buckle on this
ground: that “a belt buckle can serve its function satisfactorily without any ornamentation
of the type that renders the Kieselstein-Cord buckles distinctive.” Id. (emphasis added).
The copyright statute in defining “useful object” may be more concerned with
copyright’s own internal limits than with deference to patent law. Yet the language just
quoted is protective of patent law: the court seems to place emphasis on whether the
utilitarian article could exist and function independently without the added artwork. By
contrast, the statutory language instead asks if the aesthetic features can exist
independently.
102
I am speaking here of judicial approaches. I have not examined Copyright Office
practices.
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of objects. That so many American designers have resisted the
more easily-copyrightable route of “kitsch” suggests that design
might continue to flourish as an aesthetic and important part of our
economy whatever route copyright law chooses. Of course, the
economic fate of designers depends on far more than just copyright
law—notably, on business models, and on alternative sources of
legal protection such as trademark law.103
As you know, trademark law protects only “nonfunctional”
product designs, and the definition of “functionality” is much
debated. At least until recently, an important factor was whether
alternatives existed—if they did, a product design was likely to be
found “nonfunctional.”104 Under the still influential MortonNorwich opinion,105 the key question was whether the design at
issue was “the best or one of a few superior designs available?”106
So long as many equally good design alternatives existed, under
Morton-Norwich it looked like trademark law would protect a
significant amount of industrial design.
In the recent Supreme Court case known as TrafFix, the
relevance of alternative designs became more questionable. In
TrafFix, a company that held expired utility patents in a dual
spring design for holding signs against the wind sought to protect
the design under trademark law, based on the claim that people
103

See generally Dratler, supra note 43.
“Since the effect upon competition ‘is really the crux of the matter,’ it is, of course,
significant that there are other alternatives available.” In re Morton-Norwich Prods., 671
F.2d 1332, 1341 (C.C.P.A. 1982) (internal citations omitted). Other factors mattered as
well, but let us keep our eye on the issue of alternatives as part of the competitive-need
standard, since the presence of alternatives can often favor claimants who argue for the
nonfunctionality of their trade dress. See, e.g., Thurmon, supra note 42, at 302 n.265 (“It
is certainly true that a great many product or packaging features will be deemed nonfunctional under a competitive need standard.”).
Admittedly, an inquiry into alternatives can itself be subject to significant variation.
See, e.g., id. at 298–302 (arguing for a particular conception of alternatives).
105
The Morton-Norwich decision was approved as having continued applicability after
TrafFix in Valu Engineering, Inc. v. Rexnord Corp., 278 F.3d 1268 (Fed. Cir. 2002),
discussed infra. Thus, the Federal Circuit position is in disagreement with those courts
that see TrafFix as “radically changing” the law of functionality. Thurmon, supra note
42, at 246. The Federal Circuit interpretation in Valu Engineering “is particularly
significant because the United States Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) is bound by the
decisions of the Federal Circuit on such issues.” Id.
106
Morton-Norwich, 671 F.2d at 1341.
104
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recognized the dual spring design as source-identifying.107 The
company apparently argued that despite the expired patent,
competitors who want to use the dual spring design should at least
make it look a little different to avoid confusing the public. New
manufacturers of the sign-holding device could put a box around it,
for example, to hide the dual springs, or use a different number of
springs.108
Under such an argument, the design’s trademark status might
have been upheld if there were many possible competitive
alternatives.109 And there is some appeal in such a view: if many
ways exist for third parties to use an invention that had entered into
the public domain, without the result looking exactly like the thing
consumers had come to associate with a particular source, why not
require new users of the invention to change the appearance a
little?
The Supreme Court refused to put this burden on the new
manufacturers.110 The Court said: “A utility patent is strong
evidence that the features therein claimed are functional.”111
“Where the expired patent claimed the features in question, one
who seeks to establish trade dress protection must carry the heavy
burden of showing that the feature is not functional, for instance by
showing that it is merely an ornamental, incidental, or arbitrary
aspect of the device.”112
Moreover, wrote the Court,
Functionality having been established . . . .

107

TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Mktg. Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23, 26–27 (2001).
Id. at 33–34 (disapproving the court of appeals’ willingness to explore such
alternatives).
109
See Brief for Respondent at 21, TrafFix, 532 U.S. 23 (No. 99-1571) (“[I]f a product
feature has numerous alternatives (actual or theoretical) that serve the same useful
purpose or provide the desired ornamental impression, then allowing the patentee to
appropriate one design would not hinder competition in the relevant product market. To
the contrary, it would prevent others from depriving the trade dress owner of its
investment and goodwill, and denying the public of a distinctive source identifier
necessary for informed and effective competition.”).
110
See TrafFix, 532 U.S. at 33–34.
111
Id. at 29.
112
Id. at 30.
108
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There is no need . . . to engage, as did the Court
of Appeals, in speculation about other design
possibilities, such as using three or four springs
which might serve the same purpose . . . . The dualspring design is not an arbitrary flourish in the
configuration of MDI’s product; it is the reason the
device works. Other designs need not be
attempted.113
Whether or not the design has a competitive advantage over
other designs is irrelevant in the case where the design “is the
reason the device works.”114 Even if there are many ways to avoid
consumer confusion by covering the invention, or altering its
appearance without impairing its usefulness, that’s irrelevant.115 If
the design “is the reason the device works,”116 then at least in the
presence of an expired utility patent, TrafFix says that trademark
law must not enjoin copying by competitors.117
TrafFix is immensely controversial, and may presage new
possibilities for the development of trademark doctrine. The courts
have gone in at least two different directions in interpreting
TrafFix. One of the approaches treats TrafFix as little altering the
federal approach to functionality. Another seems to take from
TrafFix a test that remarkably resembles one version of the
copyright separability test I’ve called the “shave-off” approach.
The case that seems to see TrafFix as making little change is
Valu Engineering.118 At issue was the trademark status of a design
for conveyor-belt guard rails. In Valu Engineering, the influential
Federal Circuit said that TrafFix doesn’t really mean what it seems
to say; we can still use the old Morton-Norwich factors,119 one of
which is “the availability to competitors of functionally equivalent
113

Id. at 33–34 (citation omitted).
Id. at 33–34.
115
Id. at 34.
116
Id. at 33.
117
See id. at 35.
118
Valu Eng’g, Inc. v. Rexnord Corp., 278 F.3d 1268 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
119
Even under the Morton-Norwich approach, the court denied protection to the guide
rail design, id. at 1279, a result the court would have almost certainly reached had it
employed the TrafFix approach as interpreted by, e.g., the Eppendorf case described
below. If so, technically the case analysis is dicta.
114
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designs.”120 That is, in Valu Engineering, the Federal Circuit said
that alternative designs should continue to play a significant role in
the analysis of functionality.121
A few months later came a case called Eppendorf in the Fifth
Circuit.122 The Eppendorf company manufactured both a popular
dispenser syringe and pipette tips that would fit the syringe.123 A
third party came along and made an allegedly confusingly similar
set of pipettes which it sold at a lower price.124 That new
manufacturer advertised that its pipettes could fit the Eppendorf
syringe.125 Basically, it was a case of after-market sale of an object
that was both competitive with, and compatible with, items in
Eppendorf’s product line.126 Eppendorf alleged that many of its
pipette features were distinctive and non-functional.
120

Id. at 1274.
Id. at 1274 (citing In re Morton-Norwich Prods., Inc., 671 F.2d 1332, 1340–41
(C.C.P.A. 1982)). Wrote the Valu Engineering court:
Nothing in TrafFix suggests that consideration of alternative designs
is not properly part of the overall mix, and we do not read the Court’s
observations in TrafFix as rendering the availability of alternative
designs irrelevant. Rather, we conclude that the Court merely noted
that once a product feature is found functional based on other
considerations there is no need to consider the availability of
alternative designs, because the feature cannot be given trade dress
protection merely because there are alternative designs available. But
that does not mean that the availability of alternative designs cannot
be a legitimate source of evidence to determine whether a feature is
functional in the first place.
Id. at 1276 (footnote omitted).
There may be occasions when alternatives are important, but under TrafFix, those
occasions do not include situations where the claimed distinctive feature is the “reason
the device works.”
122
Eppendorf-Netheler-Hinz GMBH v. Ritter GMBH, 289 F.3d 351 (5th Cir. 2002),
cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1071 (2002).
123
Id. at 353.
124
Id. at 354 (noting that defendant’s pipette tips “were marketed as a ‘direct
replacement’” for plaintiff’s pipette tips).
125
Id.
126
As noted above, the crucial language in Valu Engineering may be dicta. The same
may be true of the language in Eppendorf: had the Eppendorf court employed a
competitive-necessity test, it might have come to the same result as it did using its strict
interpretation of TrafFix.
Given the importance of the Eppendorf syringes in the market, the court could have
found a competitive need to sell identical pipettes, so the pipettes could fit into the
popular syringe holder. Recognizing a trademark in Eppendorf pipettes, in other words,
121
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To assess the features’ functionality, the court conceivably
could have asked (as Morton-Norwich would have asked) if
alternative designs existed for the claimed features which could do
their job as well. The Eppendorf court refused to take this tack. It
treated as irrelevant the expert testimony offered on the question of
whether “[the design elements identified by Eppendorf] can be
changed significantly, considerably without affecting the overall
intended purpose.”127
Instead, the court assessed whether the features were necessary
to the product’s operation in the sense that, if the features were
absent, the product would no longer function.128 Because
removing the features would leave the device unable to work, the
court ruled that all the features “are essential to the operation” of

might have left little possibility of a low-cost alternative in that secondary market.
(However, the opinion does not reveal whether the features of defendant’s pipettes that
were similar to Eppendorf’s distinctive product features went further than necessary to
make its pipettes functionally compatible with the Eppendorf syringe.)
127
Eppendorf, 289 F.3d at 358 (alteration in original); see also id. at 356 n.4 (“A
product feature that satisfies [what TrafFix called] the traditional test for functionality is
not shielded from functional status merely because the feature is not a competitive
necessity.”).
128
The court uses affirmative language such as “the flange is necessary,” id. at 358, but
the opinion obviously means by “necessary” that the feature must be present in order for
the object to function. In my view, the same thought is better conveyed without overly
burdening the word “necessary,” and instead inquiring directly into whether the absence
of the item would affect the object’s functional operation.
The court used the following language:
(1) The flange is necessary to connect the Combitip to the dispenser
syringe; (2) The rings on the plunger head are necessary to lock the
plunger into a cylinder in the dispenser syringe; (3) The plunger is
necessary to push liquids out of the tip, and the ribs on the plunger
stabilize its action; (4) The tips at the lower end of the Combitips are
designed to easily fit into test tubes and other receptacles; (5) The
size of the Combitip determines the dispensed volume, and size is
essential to accurate and efficient dispensing; (6) The color scheme
used on the Combitip-clear plastic with black lettering-enables the
user easily to see and measure the amount of liquid in the Combitip,
and black is standard in the medical industry; and (7) The stumps of
the larger Combitips must be angled to separate air bubbles from the
liquid and ensure that the full volume of liquid is dispensed. Thus,
all eight design elements identified by Eppendorf are essential to the
operation of the Combitips.
Id.
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plaintiff’s pipette tips.129 Having come to this conclusion, the
court concluded that “alternative designs are not germane.”130
For example, the court said that “the flange is necessary to
connect . . . to the dispenser syringe;”131 that the plunger is
necessary to “push liquids out of the tip;”132 and that the color
scheme of clear plastic with black lettering (which the court noted
was standard in the medical industry)133 was necessary to “see and
measure the amount of liquid.”134 So all of these things were
functional, concluded the court—regardless of whether there were
alternative shapes or schemes that could have achieved the same
task.135 Apparently because a pipette must have a flange, a plunger
and lettering, all of those aspects were “functional.”
This analysis is remarkably similar to that of the Second
Circuit in the Carol Barnhart copyright case. There the court
found “no separability” in the design of mannequin torsos. Wrote
the court:
the features claimed to be aesthetic or artistic, e.g.,
the life-size configuration of the breasts and the
width of the shoulders, are inextricably intertwined
with the utilitarian feature, the display of clothes. . .
. [A] model of a human torso, in order to serve its
utilitarian function, must have some configuration
of the chest and some width of shoulders.136
Thus, the chest and shoulder designs are not “separable.”

129

Id.
Id. Although the presence of expired patents might arguably have been essential to
the TrafFix opinion, the Eppendorf opinion does not mention whether the pipettes had
ever been patented. The court instead focuses on the question of whether a feature “is the
reason the device works.” Id. at 355, 357 (quoting TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Mktg.
Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23, 33–34 (2001)).
131
Id. at 358.
132
Id.
133
To achieve protection under the Lanham Act, an object must be nonfunctional and
distinctive (source-identifying). 15 U.S.C. §§ 1052, 1127 (2006). The court may have
been intimating its doubts about the distinctiveness of the lettering.
134
Eppendorf, 289 F.3d at 358.
135
See id.
136
Carol Barnhart Inc. v. Econ. Cover Corp., 773 F.2d 411, 419 (2d Cir. 1985).
130
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Thus to resolve a trademark functionality dispute, the
Eppendorf court might be said to have used a strict, Carol
Barnhart type version of what we call the separability test in
copyright.137 The Eppendorf court saw that kind of approach as its
warrant from TrafFix.
So what lessons can we draw from these developments? One
possibility is this. After TrafFix, it appears that trademark courts
have the option of following copyright’s lead, and could employ a
separability-type “shaving-off” test that would leave many more
objects open for copying. Perhaps we can use the existing
copyright and trademark cases as a sort of laboratory from which
to gain some empirical data on whether this would be a good route
to follow. Despite the differences in the goals served by copyright
and trademark respectively, both regimes seek to avoid conflict
with patent law. The costs and benefits of “separability” in its
various versions, is worth comparing with “functionality” in its
various guises, particularly at the two extremes I have highlighted:
the copyright cases that hinge on how an object would function if
the aesthetics were shaved away, and the trademark cases that
hinge on whether the appearance of a distinctive object could be
altered (or an alternative found) without impairing functionality.
Thank you.
PROF. SCAFIDI:
Next we have Mark Janis, who is a Professor of Law and Ira C.
Batman Faculty Fellow at the Maurer School of Law at Indiana
University. It took a title that long, by the way, to lure him away
from Iowa where he was also a distinguished Chair until quite
recently.
Mark teaches and writes in the areas of patent, trademark and
unfair competition, and IP and antitrust. So he comes at this a little
more from an industrial property perspective. He is well-published
in law reviews, of course, but also has a special gift for the kind of
writing, that on any other panel but this one, I would call useful.

137

As mentioned, the resemblance is perhaps most clear in the approach to separability
taken by Carol Barnhart.
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That is to say, he’s written a casebook that a lot of you have
studied from, Trademarks & Unfair Competition; he’s also the
author of a couple volume treatise on IP and Antitrust. What I’m
most excited about is his forthcoming book on Trade Dress and
Design Law. So without further ado, Mark.
PROF. JANIS:
Thank you for the introduction. Thanks, it’s always nice to be
here at Fordham.
I’m going to talk about design patent law, the oldest form of
design protection law, at least in the U.S., but also the least
evolved. Design patent law is largely derivative of utility patent
law for better or worse. The derivation hasn’t always been very
smooth, leading some to attempt to draw analogies to trademark, to
copyright.
What I’d like to do is talk a little bit about some recent
doctrinal developments in design patent law, but mainly for the
purpose of asking an overarching question, which is, has the patent
model for design protection really proven to be all that successful?
My objective is not really to denigrate the design patent
system, though in some ways that would be easy to do. My
objective really is to ask whether there might be a way to make the
design patent system ease away from its “patentness.”
So I want to start by addressing the question from a historical
perspective. What were we thinking? Why did we decide to adopt
a patent model for design protection? There are many ways that
one could explain it.
My way may be a little bit frivolous here, but really the main
reasons I brought the slides was so I could show you a picture of
Henry Ellsworth. I think that there’s a fair argument to be made
that the main reason that we adopted a patent model for designs
was because Henry Ellsworth wanted it.138

138

Henry Leavitt Ellsworth (1791–1858) was largely responsible for the development
of the business of the United States Patent Office. See generally FRANKLIN BOWDITCH
DEXTER, BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCHES OF THE GRADUATES OF YALE COLLEGE WITH ANNALS
OF THE COLLEGE HISTORY 6, at 309–12 (Yale Univ. Press 1912).
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He was a politically powerful guy at the time, happened to be
the patent commissioner.139 In a report in 1841 to the Congress, he
said, essentially as you can see from the excerpt there, “Give me
the authority to grant patents for these objects, designs.”140 And he
says, “This could happen simply by authorizing me to issue patents
under the same limitations and on the same conditions as govern
the present action in other cases.”141
Now, how simple was that really? In 1841 or 1842, when
Congress did take his advice and passed a statute very similar to
the language of his report,142 the limitations and conditions that he
would have had in mind are really quite different than the ones that
we would have in mind today.
So, for example, at the time, there was no developed doctrine
of obviousness in utility patent law.143 Hotchkiss v. Greenwood144
had not been decided. There was not a developed claim drafting
practice either.
Certainly, we didn’t have the set of tools for defining claim
scope that we now have in utility patent law.145 One other thing:
the Ellsworth letter refers to the word “useful” in connection with
some categories of designs, suggesting that those designs could be
protected only if they possessed utility.146 While the utility patent
law did contain a utility requirement at the time,147 and design
patent law could have drawn upon it, that notion seems rather

139

See id. at 310.
HENRY L. ELLSWORTH, REPORT FROM THE COMMISSIONER OF PATENTS, H.R. DOC.
NO. 74 (1842).
141
Id.
142
Id.
143
35 U.S.C. § 103 (2006) (“A patent may not be obtained though the invention is not
identically disclosed or described as set forth in section 102 of this title [35 U.S.C. §
102], if the differences between the subject matter sought to be patented and the prior art
are such that the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time the
invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject
matter pertains.”); see also CHISUM, supra note 5, § 1:OV.2.
144
52 U.S. 248 (1851).
145
See generally Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc).
146
HENRY L. ELLSWORTH, REPORT FROM THE COMMISSIONER OF PATENTS, H.R. DOC.
NO. 74 (1842).
147
35 U.S.C. § 101.
140
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strange for design protection, where we’re usually interested in
ensuring non-functionality, rather than functionality.
So the patent model that Henry Ellsworth had in mind really
was necessarily quite different than the patent model that we have
today for designs. Indeed, some of the doctrines that have been
most troublesome in design patent law are the very ones that I have
just mentioned: obviousness, claim scope, and non-functionality.
I now want to explore those doctrines a bit to ask the following
question: have these doctrines been troublesome just because
patent law is difficult and its doctrines aren’t always pure, or have
these doctrines been difficult for a common reason, that the patent
model, at least as we know it today, isn’t a very good fit for
protecting design?
So let me start with obviousness and detail a couple of debates
that have arisen recently with respect to design patent obviousness.
First, I would suggest that the very idea of applying the utility
patent doctrine of obviousness to designs is a challenging concept
to grasp. I take comfort in the fact that I have some good company
in that: Judge Rich.
The design patent obviousness requirement comes to design
patents implicitly through this incorporation clause in § 171,148
written by Judge Rich,149 who also wrote § 103.150
But if you actually tried to follow the statute applying § 103,
which Judge Rich wrote, by way of § 171, which he wrote, that
was difficult. He complained about it himself, “Applying
obviousness to designs is impossible,” he said in his concurring
opinion in the Nalbandian case.151
In very typical, Judge Rich fashion, he went on in that
concurring opinion to say, “And let me just tell you something
about the writing of the patent statute, which by the way, I was
148

Id. § 171.
Giles S. Rich served on the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
from 1956 until his death in 1999. See Richard A. Oppel, Jr., Giles S. Rich, Oldest Active
Federal Judge, Dies at 95, N.Y. TIMES, June 12, 1999, at A13; see also James F. Davis,
Judge Giles S. Rich: His Life and Legacy Revisited, LANDSLIDE, Sept.–Oct. 2009, at 8.
150
35 U.S.C. § 103.
151
In re Nalbandian, 661 F.2d 1214, 1218–19 (C.C.P.A. 1981) (Rich, J., concurring).
149
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responsible for in part. What we decided to do was throw in this
incorporation clause, knowing that obviousness was going to be a
problem, and come back to it later. And we never have, and this is
the problem.”152
He went on in this opinion to say, “And by the way, there’ve
been 70 odd,” maybe at the time 40 or 50 odd, “legislative
proposals for comprehensive design patent protection. The bar
should be behind those.”153
Judge Rich was surely right that obviousness is difficult to
apply to designs, and perhaps he was right that obviousness was
never really intended to endure over the long term as a requirement
for design protection. Compounding that, the law of obviousness
in utility patents has been pretty volatile.
And further
compounding that, the law of design patents outside of
obviousness has been pretty volatile in ways that affect design
patent obviousness, and that’s just starting to show up in the court
decisions.
Consider, for example, the ordinary-observer test versus the
ordinary-designer test. Utility patent law says that obviousness is
measured through the eyes of a person of ordinary skill in the
art.154 Design patent law, after some controversy played out in the
Nalbandian case, now says that obviousness is to be measured
through the eyes of the ordinary designer.155 These propositions
sound consistent.
The problem comes in that infringement in design patents has
always been measured through the eyes of the ordinary observer,
first in Gorham v. White156 and then more recently, in the Egyptian
Goddess157 case, which reestablished a version of the ordinaryobserver test as the dominant test.
Perhaps symmetry between utility patent obviousness and
design patent obviousness should be the objective, or perhaps
152
153
154
155
156
157

Id.
Id. at 1219 n.1.
35 U.S.C. § 103(a).
Nalbandian, 661 F.2d at 1216.
81 U.S. 511, 528 (1872).
Egyptian Goddess, Inc. v. Swisa, 543 F.3d 665, 678 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
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symmetry between design patent obviousness and design patent
infringement is more important. Either way, the issue seems to be
puzzling to courts at the highest level. Recently, in the Titan
Tire158 case, the issue did come up, and here’s what the Federal
Circuit had to say about it. Now, in fairness to the Federal Circuit,
they probably didn’t have to resolve this legal question in order to
decide the case, which may explain the ambivalent rhetoric. The
Federal Circuit said that its Egyptian Goddess opinion was directed
to design patent infringement (of course), and particularly to
reestablishing the ordinary observer test for design patent
infringement.159 Then the Federal Circuit proceeded to say that
“It’s not clear to what extent, if any, the doctrine applicable to
obviousness should be modified to conform to that approach.”160
Perhaps the court was right to avoid plunging into dicta. But
sometimes these sorts of statements can be frustrating, particularly
in the area of design patents, where the number of cases is limited.
Who is going to tell us what is clear, if not the Federal Circuit?
The issue of symmetry between design patent obviousness and
utility patent obviousness also arose in the Titan Tire case. The
main point of controversy here concerns the teaching-suggestionmotivation test, and the distinction between rigid and flexible
applications of that test.161
Here is the Federal Circuit’s version of the teaching-suggestion
-motivation test as applied to design patents, as recited in the
Durling v. Spectrum Furniture162 case.
An obviousness
combination requires a primary reference, “the design
characteristics of which are basically the same as the claimed
design,”163 and secondary references sufficiently related to the
primary reference “that the appearance of certain ornamental
features in one would suggest the application of those features to

158

Titan Tire Corp. v. Case New Holland, Inc., 566 F.3d 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
Id. at 1384.
160
Id.
161
Id. at 1380–81.
162
Durling v. Spectrum Furniture Co., 101 F.3d 100, 103 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (“More
specifically the inquiry is whether one of ordinary skill would have combined teachings
of the prior art to create the same overall visual appearance as the claimed design.”).
163
Id.
159
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the other.”164 There are lots of requirements for the primary
reference and for the secondary references. That strikes me as
being really quite rigid.
That might be problematic because in KSR International Co. v.
Teleflex Inc.,165 a utility patent case of course, the Supreme Court
clearly rejected a rigid view of the teaching-suggestion-motivation
test.166 Should that same reasoning apply in the design patent
context? In the Titan Tire case, the Federal Circuit was a little coy
on the point. The court said that design patents “like utility patents,
must meet the nonobviousness requirement”167 and then said “it is
not obvious that the Supreme Court necessarily intended to
exclude design patents from the reach of KSR.”168
I take away from this just a lingering question. Maybe this
struggle is symptomatic of a larger problem in that we’re trying to
fit this utility patent model to designs and maybe that just was an
awkward thing all the way along.
Now, consider the inquiry into design patent claim scope. Here
we have the Gorham v. White standard, the famous ordinaryobserver standard for patent infringement of a design.169 One thing
to notice about this test is that it really is not very analogous to
modern utility patent infringement law at all. Perhaps, even then,
the Court was resisting the patent analogy. The Gorham standard
has more in common with modern trademark law, with its
references to deception of observers and product diversion and so
forth.170
In Egyptian Goddess, the en banc Federal Circuit discarded the
point-of-novelty test and reinstalled a version of the ordinary164

Id.
550 U.S. 398 (2007).
166
Id. at 427.
167
Titan Tire Corp. v. Case New Holland, Inc., 566 F.3d 1372, 1384 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
168
Id. at 1385.
169
Gorham Co. v. White, 81 U.S. 511, 528 (1871) (“[I]n the eye of an ordinary
observer, giving such attention as a purchaser usually gives, two designs are substantially
the same, if the resemblance is such as to deceive such an observer, inducing him to
purchase one supposing it to be the other, the first one patented is infringed by the
other.”).
170
See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 1114 (2006) (defining the likelihood of confusion standard of
infringement as “likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive”).
165
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observer test, where the ordinary observer is capable of comparing
the claimed design with the accused design against the backdrop of
prior art designs.171 We could argue about whether the Federal
Circuit’s decision makes the standard more like a patent standard,
or perhaps just something that is sui generis.
But in another part of its opinion, the court clearly moved away
from the patent analogy.
That part speaks about claim
construction—a central exercise in any modern utility patent
litigation—and there were lots of questions in design patent cases
about whether the design patent claim, which is defined by the
drawings, needs to be construed in words.
In the relevant part of the Egyptian Goddess decision, the
Federal Circuit answered those questions by saying that claim
construction in words ordinarily should not be undertaken in a
design patent case because it’s too difficult.172 I think too difficult
probably meant, usually too narrowing.
But the Federal Circuit also said that “the trial court could
usefully guide the finder of fact by addressing a number of other
issues that bear on the scope of the claim;”173 and the court listed
the issues: “describing the role of particular conventions in design
patent drafting;”174 “describing the effect of any representations
that may have been made in the course of the prosecution
history;”175 and “distinguishing between those features of the
claimed design that are ornamental and those that are purely
functional.”176
We should wonder what’s going on here. The Federal Circuit
has backed away from the central focus of utility patent
infringement litigation claim construction, perhaps because it just
isn’t a very good fit for litigating design patents. But did it really
mean also to discard the accompanying tools of claim construction
altogether? Did it really mean to make them merely optional?

171
172
173
174
175
176

Egyptian Goddess, Inc. v. Swisa, 543 F.3d 665, 678 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
Id. at 679–80.
Id. at 680.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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For example, what if a design patent applicant makes limiting
statements about the meaning of its claim in the prosecution
history. Is it optional to take those into account? Or is the court
required to take that into account?
What about other canons of claim construction? Do claims
have to be assessed the same way for validity as for infringement,
for example? That seems very central to concepts of patent law.
Here we have a district court in International Seaway Trading
Corp. v. Walgreens Corp.177 saying, “I’m not so sure that I do need
to do that.” I really think this has to be wrong.178
So, again, are these just the sort of ordinary doctrinal issues
that have to be worked through? It may be so.
But might they also indicate something about the robustness of
a patent model for designs? I think the latter.
Finally, let me talk a little bit about functionality. A doctrine
that takes us firmly away from any utility patent analogy, of
course.
Consider the acronym, FUBAR. FUBAR, which I understand
to mean “Fouled up beyond any recognition.” That’s what my
mother told me anyway. But it also stands for “Functional utility
bar.” Let me just ask you, if you are representing a defendant in a
design patent case, wouldn’t you love it if your accused device was
named the functional utility bar? Perfect. Perfect.
That’s Richardson v. Stanley Works, Inc.179 This will be an
interesting case to watch, decided in the District of Arizona, and
pending at the Federal Circuit. In fact, the oral arguments are
coming up here in a couple of weeks. It is a case that could go
away quietly or it could involve some really important issues in
design patent.180
177

599 F. Supp. 2d 1307, 1314–15 (S.D. Fla. 2009).
Shortly after the Symposium, the Federal Circuit decided on appeal in International
Seaway that courts must assess anticipation in the same way that they assess
infringement: the point-of-novelty analysis should be discarded for anticipation, just as it
was discarded for infringement, and only the ordinary observer test applies. Int’l Seaway
Trading Corp. v. Walgreens Corp., 589 F.3d 1233, 1235 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
179
610 F. Supp. 2d 1046 (D. Ariz. 2009).
180
After the Symposium, the Federal Circuit decided Richardson on appeal. Richardson
v. Stanley Works, Inc., 597 F.3d 1288, 1293 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (concluding that it was
178
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It may go away quietly if the court thinks that the claimed and
accused devices, illustrated here, just don’t look very similar to an
ordinary observer. And maybe they don’t.
So maybe it’s possible to dispose of this case without really
any high-level legal analysis. That’s not the way the case is
framed though. The case has been framed as a case all about
functionality.181 The plaintiff says that you have to look at the
overall appearance of the design in assessing functionality.182 The
defendant urges the court to look at individual features, attribute de
facto functions to them, and filter those out in determining
infringement.183
There is a problem currently with the way this issue is
structured in design patents, although I won’t have time to discuss
the issue in depth. There is Federal Circuit law saying that as a
matter of claim construction, you should filter out functional
features,184 which sounds consistent with a lot of design law and
gives some support to the defendant’s position.
On the other hand, Egyptian Goddess seems to strike a contrary
theme. The court in Egyptian Goddess discarded the point-ofnovelty test on the ground that it lent too much attention to
individual features.185 So there’s a real tension here that this case
about the FUBAR brings up, at least as the case is briefed.
I’ll pass over my ideas on how that tension should be resolved,
and instead conclude by noting that these sorts of disputes do raise,
for me, questions about the robustness of the patent analogy and do
suggest to me that we really ought to think about moving away
from that analogy—easing away from obviousness, easing away

proper for the lower court to filter out functional elements as part of the exercise of claim
construction). Richardson and related developments are explored in more detail in
GRAEME B. DINWOODIE & MARK D. JANIS, TRADE DRESS & DESIGN LAW chs. 5–6
(forthcoming 2010).
181
Richardson, 610 F. Supp. at 105152.
182
Id. at 1052.
183
Id. at 105253.
184
Id. at 1051 (quoting Amini Innovation Corp. v. Anthony Cal., Inc., 439 F.3d 1365,
1372 (Fed. Cir. 2006)).
185
Egyptian Goddess, Inc. v. Swisa, 543 F.3d 665, 677 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
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from claims, and overall, easing away from a patent analogy. So
I’m past my time, let me sit down, thank you for your attention.
PROF. SCAFIDI:
And finally, we have Jonathan Moskin, who is kind enough to
join us from Foley and Lardner. He’s a Partner and a member of
the Litigation, Trademark, Copyright and Advertising, Privacy,
and Security & Information Management Practices. In other
words, he wears a lot of IP-related hats.
Jonathan is currently Chair of the New York Intellectual
Property Law Association’s Privacy Law Committee and has, in
the past, served as Chairman of the New York Intellectual Property
Law Association’s Internet Law and Design Protection
Committees.
Jonathan also does a great deal of editorial and writing work, as
editor of The Trademark Reporter, as a member of the Editorial
Board of the Intellectual Property Strategist and also an Editorial
Board Member for the Queen Mary Studies in IP Law and Policy
Series.
In other words, Jonathan, as I always think of him, is really an
academic in practitioner’s clothing. But let’s face it, that’s usually
much nicer clothing. So, welcome, Jonathan.
MR. MOSKIN:
You are the only person, I think, who’s ever complimented me
on my clothing.
So I have to say, after listening to the previous three speakers,
as well as the speakers early this morning, on Bilski, I really have
no idea what I want to tell you.
I will say that last night, I was speaking with my former
partner, Jim Dabney. He raised the question, well, what do these
two topics have to do with one another? One theme that has not
yet emerged from the other panelists, but I do think really does
unite the discussion earlier this morning about Bilski as well as the
discussion we’re having now, is the concern that all aspects of
intellectually property law share for not impinging too much on
competition. So the anti-trust flip-side of the coin of intellectual
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property protection is not overextending the limited monopolies
that are granted.
I really think that if you look at some of the cases, and I’ll walk
you through some of them, what you’ll see is that to some extent, I
think that what courts are struggling with and what we have been
struggling with in defining what is functional and how to limit
protection for the trade risk rights, stems from that, that these are
all related concepts.
I’ve identified some of the main concepts that bear on this
issue. Many of these have already been addressed, so what I’ll
really do is instead of focusing on these now, is just walk you
through some history. This is the Two Pesos186 case in the
Supreme Court, which is often cited as the “High-water mark of
design protection under trademark law, under the Lanham Act,”
and you can see these look like just two large, almost generic
Mexican or Tex-Mex restaurants, a very unlikely subject matter for
the Supreme Court to announce very broad doctrine that it was
going to protect trade dress rights and the appearance, the overall
or outwards appearance of these restaurants.187
Yet this is in fact what the Supreme Court did and I won’t
dwell on all of the language here, you can read the slide yourself,
but what the Court rejected here was a requirement that the
claimed trade dress owner prove secondary meaning,188 that as
long as the restaurant, and again you tell me if you think there’s
something inherently distinctive about these, as long as there was a
sufficient inherent distinctiveness to the claimed trade dress, that’s
good enough, at least as of 1992.189
Continuing in this trend, although there were some limitations
that the Supreme Court imposed in the Qualitex190 case, here too, a
color by itself was deemed protectable as trade dress191 and I
think—I know I’ve been practicing in this field for quite awhile—
many people in the field assumed at this point in time that virtually
186
187
188
189
190
191

Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763 (1992).
Id. at 76566.
Id. at 775.
Id. at 776.
Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159 (1995).
Id. at 161.
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any type of trade dress could be protectable. There were
protections being extended to sound marks and all sorts of other
things at this time,192 oh, well, here, for another example, part of
the same general time period, the design of Ferrari, which had long
since ceased being in production. A car kit company was making
reproductions of it and it was still deemed to be protectable as an
indication of source and therefore protectable under the Lanham
Act.193
You’ll come to see more recently, as the law has changed, that
just a couple of years ago, the Massachusetts Federal Court had a
case involving the Shelby Cobra design and for some of the
reasons we’ll now discuss, and came to the very conclusion that
the Cobra design, no matter how distinctive it was, wasn’t
protectable.194
So what is the underlying concept, or limiting concept, that the
courts have wrestled with? That’s whether the design in question
is identifiable to consumers and identifies the source of the
product.
That’s a very tricky thing to answer. In the case that marked
the change in the law, Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Brothers
Inc.,195 the designs were these appliqués to children’s clothing.196
Interesting, because this case involved copyright as well as trade
dress, the plaintiff won on both theories below and the Supreme
Court reversed, but only on the trade dress claim.197 In language
that has since bedeviled this field, the Court focused on the fact,
well, does this really identify the source of the product or is it just
a design?198 If it’s a design, then, sure, it can be protected under
copyright, but not under trademark.199
192

For example, Anheuser-Busch was granted federal registration for the sound of a
howling wolf used in beer commercials. Jeffery S. Edelstein & Cathy L. Leuders, Recent
Developments in Trade Dress Infringement Law, 40 IDEA 105, 122 (2000).
193
Ferrari S.p.A Esercizio Fabbriche Auto. E Corse v. McBurnie Coachcraft, Inc., No.
86-1812-B, 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16314, at *810 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 31, 1988).
194
Shelby v. Superformance Int’l, Inc., 251 F. Supp. 2d 983, 987 (D. Mass. 2002).
195
529 U.S. 205 (2000).
196
Id. at 207–08.
197
Id. at 216.
198
See id. at 212–15.
199
Id. at 214.
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Essentially, what I think the court was wrestling with is the
design, is it a symbol of origin? Does it identify source? If so,
how do you prove that? Or is it the thing itself? If it’s the thing
itself, then we have to be very careful about how we protect it.
I’m not a classics scholar, but I have put down here a quote
from Umberto Eco, defining what we mean by a symbol anyway. I
think it really is part of the conceptual struggle here, there is no
absent half when the thing itself is what you’re talking about
protecting as a design, as a trademark, or trade dress.
Some of you may be—I don’t know if they teach Sigmund
Freud any longer in college, but as Freud, who was considered, I
suppose, the master of what were the meanings of symbols, even
he recognized that sometimes a good cigar is just a good cigar.
That was a joke, by the way, but looking back to the definition
in the statute itself, what is a trademark? The Lanham Act
specifically calls out that it has to be a source-indicating symbol.200
It has to identify and distinguish the goods of the merchant.201 So
it is unlike, I think, the questions that were just assumed in the Two
Pesos case, there is a very tough question. Is it distinctive? Is it
just inherently distinctive;202 the kind of thing that we might think
of as being protectable under copyright? Or does it serve this other
function? Is it somehow, even though it’s all part of the thing
itself, is it representing some absent half? Is there some other
secondary meaning? Is there some other broader significance that
it has and how do we disentangle these questions?
Now, following the Samara Brothers decision, Congress
stepped in and essentially created a presumption that trade dress,
trade dress generally, and not simply the thing itself, is
functional.203 I went back this morning, because I was puzzled
about this, and looked at the Samara Brothers decision itself, and
was interested in what Justice Scalia said—in looking at those, I
don’t think I need to go back to the slide of the children’s
clothing—which was that “consumers should not be deprived of
200
201
202
203

See 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2006).
Id.
Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 769 (1992).
See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(3).
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the benefits of competition with regard to the utilitarian and
aesthetic purposes that product design ordinarily serves.”204 He
was grouping together the utilitarian and the aesthetic.
Although the Samara Brothers case has been cited in the
increasingly muddy discussion, the Supreme Court meant to bar
protection for aesthetically functional products or designs. I think
he was certainly throwing all these things together because of the
anti-competitive nature of extending protection too broadly to
product designs.
Congress seems to have taken that lead by, as I say, creating a
presumption that all product designs, not simply the thing itself,
but any types of trade dress are presumptively functional.205 I
think in using the same broad term, “functional” in the same broad
way that Justice Scalia was using it in the Samara Brothers case,
such an approach does not distinguish between utilitarian
functionality and aesthetic functionality, but rather embraces a
broader concern about not extending anti-competitive rights that
prevent people from making products that are useful for all of us.
Now I don’t really want to spend too much time on
distinguishing trade dress concerns from copyright and patent. The
two other speakers, Professor Gordon and Professor Janis, have
already gone into much greater length than I could possibly do on
that, but the difficulties, I think, exist in how we distinguish these
features from one another. I was speaking with one of the speakers
this morning about how the Supreme Court was going to decide
the Bilski case. His comment, and I hate to quote somebody who’s
not even here any longer, about an off-the-record comment he
made, was, “Well, sheet music certainly couldn’t be patentable,
that’s protected by copyright.”
But what if the sheet music served as a sort of therapeutic
function to improve one’s mood or as a cure for depression? I
recited to him, a very recent book by Oliver Sacks who goes on at
great length about the benefits of music in just this way.

204
205

Samara Bros., 529 U.S. at 213.
See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(3).
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Now, if there was such a therapeutic benefit to a piece of sheet
music, now would that also then make it ineligible for copyright
protection? I also want to mention that on the issue of design
protection, one of the really fundamental problems is not just in
defining what is the proper test for ornamentality or infringement,
but also the fact that the courts have construed design patents to
have literally no scope. There is a practical problem that—I know
I litigated one design patent case up to the Federal Circuit, and
although we won, it’s very difficult, and I’ve concluded, very
difficult to protect design patents in any meaningful way.
I have included in the materials, an article, which suggests—
somewhat inspired by that litigation, but for other broader
reasons—that one way to make design patents more relevant is
really to take the Supreme Court and the Gorham case at its word
and start treating these cases more like trademark or copyright
cases and find out what ordinary observers think.206 Conduct
consumer surveys; there have been almost no such surveys
conducted in design patent cases,207 which I find remarkable. I
suspect that’s really more a function of the way the law is
practiced, namely that design patent cases are often litigated by
patent lawyers, whereas trademark cases are litigated by trademark
lawyers and there aren’t very many people like me who, well,
litigate all sorts of cases and think that, as Professor Scafidi said at
the outset, this is all somehow part of what we call intellectual
property law.
Again, Professor Gordon discussed the Dastar case at greater
length. I won’t dwell on it. But I will just say that there’s a certain
irony in the Supreme Court’s language that there is this “carefully
crafted bargain.”208 I think it says, I think, one thing, if you
conclude nothing else from today’s discussion, that it really is a
mess.
Demonstrating, again, just briefly, why this is all so difficult to
apply, here’s a picture from a recent Second Circuit decision in

206

Moskin, supra note 27, at 702.
Id. at 703.
208
Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23, 33 (2003) (quoting
Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 151 (1989)).
207
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which, again, not unlike the Samara Brothers case, the court said
that the Yurman Design was protectable under copyright, but not
under trademark.209
The issue of copyright protection was not addressed on appeal,
and at the risk of making the obvious pun, had it been addressed, I
frankly wonder how the court would have disentangled the
separate strands that are shown here, with copyright protection as
distinct from trademark protection.
The case did begin to enunciate some very tough tests that have
been followed since, including in the case that’s shown here. By a
show of hands, would any of you care to guess whether this design
is protectable as trade dress?
Anyone say yes? Who thinks it is protectable?
Well, we have two. The rest of you all, you think it’s not?
Well, in fact, the Southern District, fairly recently, actually
very recently, held that it’s not.210 These are some of the factors
that the court looked at. Again, how I don’t think the right hand
necessarily knows what the left hand is doing, but if you look at
some of the factors that the court insisted, even as a matter of
pleading, that the plaintiff show, and this probably comes from the
Yurman case, as well as an earlier Second Circuit case, the
Landscape Forms211 decision, what the court is requiring is
something not unlike a mark-and-tie test where if you’re claiming

209

See Yurman Design, Inc. v. PAJ, Inc., 262 F.3d 101, 110–18 (2d Cir. 2001).
Heller, Inc. v. Design Within Reach, Inc., No. 09 Civ. 1909, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
71991, at *17–18 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 14, 2009).
211
Landscape Forms, Inc. v. Columbia Cascade Co., 113 F.3d 376, 381 (2d Cir. 1997)
(“Nonetheless, focus on the overall look of a product does not permit a plaintiff to
dispense with an articulation of the specific elements which comprise its distinct dress.
Without such a precise expression of the character and scope of the claimed trade dress,
litigation will be difficult, as courts will be unable to evaluate how unique and
unexpected the design elements are in the relevant market. Courts will also be unable to
shape narrowly-tailored relief if they do not know what distinctive combination of
ingredients deserves protection. Moreover, a plaintiff's inability to explain to a court
exactly which aspects of its product design(s) merit protection may indicate that its claim
is pitched at an improper level of generality, i.e., the claimant seeks protection for an
unprotectable style, theme or idea.”).
210
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rights and trade dress, you now have to articulate all of the
elements that you believe are protectable.212
The reason the court has said, not just this court, but other
courts have said this—this brings me back to the other theme that I
think unites a lot of these, the discussion that we’ve had this
morning, in putting on Bilski—it’s the anti-competitive nature of
overextending rights in these designs. The court was clearly very
worried that if we’re going to give rights in a trade dress design,
the claimed trade dress owner has to be able to tell us exactly what
it is he is claiming, in which he is claiming protection, and if he
can’t, he won’t get protection.213
I guess I’ll just skip over this, but one of the other parts of the
concern here, I’ll very, very quickly mention, also limiting rights
and trade dress, is since source indication is such a troubling,
difficult notion when you’re talking about the thing itself, the
courts have also, and this is just one example, said, well, fine, you
may have a distinctive bottle shape here, but you need to tell
people where it comes from. Doesn’t that solve all of your
concerns about source indication? That indeed is what the Second
Circuit has said,214 and again, this is the principle enunciated by
the Second Circuit, this includes extensive discussions about not
overextending the Lanham Act to make it an anti-competitive body
of law.
So thank you very much.
PROF. SCAFIDI:
As our panelists return to the dais, a quick recommendation for
after we adjourn for the day. Chairs seem to be on the agenda for
today and we’re just a few blocks from the Museum of Art and
Design, which at the moment has some really cool chairs on
exhibit. So you could go test the theory of whether it’s all just
American kitsch or not.
All right. Let us begin our Q&A session, perhaps by my
suggesting to the moderators and panelists that they address one
212

See Heller, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 71991, at *14–17.
See id.
214
See Nora Beverages, Inc. v. Perrier Group of Am., Inc., 269 F.3d 114, 122 (2d Cir.
2001).
213
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another briefly. Orit has put a very clear suggestion on the table
that one way to fix the problem is, and I summarize here, to move
from the copyright perspective and allow registration of even
things that may very well be functional, with the reservation that
this can be determined later, at the point of an infringement action.
Now, Mark, and implicitly Jonathan, I think, have endorsed
something a little different and that is making design patents less
patent-like, which is another possibility for how to try to resolve an
issue like this. So I wonder if you all could address one another’s
proposals and also, Wendy and Jonathan, you could take a look,
from the criticisms that you’ve made or comments that you’ve
made, at those proposals and tell us what you think.
PROF. GORDON:
Well, I have a very small point to make. I learned an awful lot
from Jonathan, and now I think I have a small contribution for you.
Remember, the Yurman bracelets, about which you made the
entangling separability joke?
I don’t think the bracelets would be “useful articles” to begin
with, so I don’t think I have to worry about separability.
MR. MOSKIN:
Well, if by that standard, then I don’t necessarily disagree with
you, but I think in keeping with a long tradition in the law, clothing
has also been deemed to be functional, utilitarian. There’s a lot
one could say here. I think abstract designs are particularly
difficult to protect under copyright because it’s so hard to separate
out conceptually what’s unique about the design from—unlike a
figurative element, a simple example, the Mazer v. Stein swan, in
the Yurman bracelet.
PROF. GORDON:
It was a Balinese dancer in Mazer.215
MR. MOSKIN:
Was it?
PROF. GORDON:

215

Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 202 (1954).
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Yes. It was very swan-like though.
PROF. SCAFIDI:
Caryatid actually.
A classical carved figure carrying
something on her head
MR. MOSKIN:
Anyway, we don’t need to digress.
PROF. SCAFIDI:
Yes.
MR. MOSKIN:
Quite that far.
But I think it’s very difficult to disentangle those strands and
the history—essentially all fashion is inherently functional,
because it’s meant to be worn.
PROF. SCAFIDI:
And yet jewelry—Wendy’s correct, jewelry is treated
differently and subject to copyright. Strangely, strangely you’re
right. Because it still has to fit the body.
MR. MOSKIN:
Right.
PROF. SCAFIDI:
Yes. Great point.
So?
MR. MOSKIN:
I will, if I can, jump in on that. There is, since I was talking
about anti-competitive concerns, the thing that really jumped out at
me, a concern about just giving registrations and then let the
parties fight it out later, is precisely what the Supreme Court said
in the Samara Brothers case, and Justice Scalia was very explicit,
he wanted to limit the anti-competitive effects of giving protection
and he wanted to create a bright line so that parties couldn’t file
anti-competitive lawsuits that would run up enormous bills and one
could then use the leverage of litigation itself to establish effective
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intellectual property rights, where they were not inherently worthy
of being protected.216
PROF. FISCHMAN AFORI:
But I think that—anyway, this is the situation with copyright. I
think that design is a branch of copyright law and copyright law
reacts in the same way. I mean, there’s no registration, or at least
the registration is not compulsory.217 Rather, it is needed in order
to file a suit.218 Then you go to court and challenge open
standards, such as whether the work is original and whether there
is substantial similarity, etc. I think there’s no difference between
these kinds of standards and the non-functionality standard.
PROF. JANIS:
Let me jump in and say that I’ve known Wendy for a long
time, this is the first time I’ve ever seen her perform the Balinese
dancer, I’m going to remember that.
One reaction to the proposal about functionality, I need to
understand a little better, I’m looking forward to reading the paper.
But one thing I’m struck by is the fact that in some ways that’s the
way that functionality is already being applied. You could take
design patents, for example, where in theory there’s an
examination, in theory there would be an examination of
functionality and there would be a discussion of functionality from
a validity perspective219 and then there would be another
discussion, perhaps, from an infringement perspective.220
But in fact, there isn’t much prosecution in design patents. So
in fact, what you describe may be very close to what is already
going on, at least in the design patent area, quite possibly others, so
I would want to think more about your proposal and how it fits
really with what’s currently going on.
216

See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros, Inc., 529 U.S. 205, 213–14 (2000).
17 U.S.C. § 408(a) (2006).
218
Id. § 411(a).
219
See, e.g., Best Lock Corp. v. Ilco Unican Corp., 94 F.3d 1563, 1566–67 (Fed. Cir.
1996) (invalidating design patents on the basis of functionality). See generally
DINWOODIE & JANIS, supra note 180, at ch. 5 (discussing functionality as a design patent
validity doctrine).
220
See Richardson v. Stanley Works, Inc., 597 F.3d 1288, 1294–96 (Fed. Cir. 2010)
(discussing functionality in the context of an infringement allegation).
217

C03_PANEL_2_FINAL_05-25-10 (DO NOT DELETE)

2010]

IP PROTECTION FOR DESIGN

5/25/2010 2:43 PM

837

PROF. FISCHMAN AFORI:
I agree. I think that I have just described what is going on in
reality, and I’m putting this reality “on the table.”
PROF. JANIS:
Yes.
PROF. FISCHMAN AFORI:
Start with this pattern design, there is no registration, there is
no prosecution, it’s a deposit and nothing more. I personally think
that also deposits should be eliminated.
It should be a kind of short term copyright, for ten years, and it
is in accordance with TRIPS.221
By the way, I think that in the 1976 U.S. copyright bill, there
was a chapter suggesting this kind of a short-term copyright for
designs.222 However, at the last minute it was taken off by
Congress, and I don’t know why. I couldn’t find any explanation
for why it was taken out from the 1976 bill.
PROF. GORDON:
Jerry Reichman has some valuable discussion on that.223
MR. MOSKIN:
What scope of protection would you suggest be allowed to
these design registrations?
PROF. FISCHMAN AFORI:
Anti-copying, like copyright . Short-term copyright.
MR. MOSKIN:
Yes.
PROF. FISCHMAN AFORI:
And by the way, also the Paris Convention, gives freedom to
the countries to decide whether designs should be protected
221
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights art. 26.3, Apr.
15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C,
33 I.L.M. 1125, 1207 (1994).
222
Albert C. Johnston, Where Is the Protection for Creative Product Design?, 19 U.
BALT. L. REV. 191, 194 (1989).
223
See, e.g., Reichman, supra note 83, at 1262 n.644.
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through the patent route, including a high threshold of novelty and
strong monopoly right,224 or through a copyright system, which
includes an originality threshold, and a right against copying.225
Therofore, all the options are open. The shorter copyright path is a
better position in my view.
PROF. SCAFIDI:
I see some audience members with hands already in the air, so
perhaps we can turn to the audience at this point.
The organizers have asked that you please take the microphone
and state your name before you begin speaking. This is for the
record, so who is eager to begin?
MR. HOFFBERG:
With respect to simply depositing registration of designs, with
a copyright, you have an intentional infringement issue.
Infringement cannot occur unless somebody has actually copied
something.226 That sets a threshold on an enforcement procedure.
If you have an innocent infringement of a design, that creates
the hazard of very significant amounts of litigation?
PROF. FISCHMAN AFORI:
Well, I’m not familiar with all of the American cases, but as far
as I know, for example, in European cases, ultimately the court
224
See Paris Convention on the Protection of Intellectual Property art. 5(5), Mar. 20,
1883 (as amended Sept. 28, 1979), 21 U.S.T. 1583; see also Orit Fischman Afori,
Reconceptualizing Property in Designs, 25 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT L.J. 1105, 1129 (2008)
[hereinafter Fischman Afori, Reconceptualizing] (“At the Convention, there was a long
debate as to whether designs should be included in this instrument. This debate was
partly resolved in 1958, when Article 5(5) of the Paris Convention was adopted,
according to which ‘Industrial Designs shall be protected in all the countries of the
Union.’ Notably the parties agreed only on the obligation to protect designs, without
setting any standard with respect to the eligibility or scope of design protection.”
(footnotes omitted)).
225
See Fischman Afori, Reconceptualizing, supra note 224, at 1129 (“Notably, the
parties agreed only on the obligation to protect designs, without setting any standard with
respect to the eligibility or scope of design protection. Therefore, once something is
identified as an industrial design according to a member state’s law, it is protected.
However, such protection can be achieved by a wide spectrum of legal means, from
copyright, to special design laws assimilated into patent law, to unfair competition
law.”(footnotes omitted)).
226
See Laureyssens v. Idea Group, Inc., 964 F.2d 131, 139 (2d Cir. 1992).
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asks whether it was copied. There is a limitless range of scenarios.
Ultimately, the question turns to focus on whether there was
copying or not. I’m proposing to admit that in reality design law is
treated as a short term copyright and courts do look after an act of
copying in order to conclude that there was infringement.
MR. MOSKIN:
Yes, I don’t think the U.S. has a subjective standard of good
faith on design infringement.
PROF. JANIS:
For U.S. design patents, after Egyptian Goddess, I think we’re
moving away from the anti-copying regime because when there
was a requirement to show appropriation of points of novelty and
substantial similarity,227 that was very much like copyright and it
was pretty hard to imagine the case where unintentionally, you
appropriated all these points of novelty. That point-of-novelty test
is now gone, so one could say that it raises the possibility of
unintentional infringement. I kind of doubt that it will happen, but
at least there is the possibility of that.
So that’s the trend in U.S. design patent enforcement, going
away from a copyright model, as I would characterize it, anyway.
MR. MOSKIN:
Well, the fact is, is that anyone who’s litigated any of these
sorts of cases knows patent cases as well as copyright. Copyright
is inherent in the definition of infringement, yes, there must be an
initial finding of copying. But, of course, that can be established
through indirect proof of access and similarity,228 but every one of
these sorts of cases, frequently, gets bogged down in accusations of
willful infringement and copying.

227

See Litton Sys., Inc. v. Whirlpool Corp., 728 F.2d 1423, 1444 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
Laureyssens, 964 F.2d at 140 (“Copying may be established either by direct
evidence of copying or by indirect evidence, including access to the copyrighted work,
similarities that are probative of copying between the works, and expert testimony. If
actual copying is established, a plaintiff must then show that the copying amounts to an
improper appropriation by demonstrating that substantial similarity to protected material
exists between the two works.”).
228
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Design patent cases, or any kind of patent case, you want to get
willful infringement because it enhances your damages.229
Trademark cases, even though there are plenty of cases saying that
we don’t care whether copying was intentional because that
doesn’t influence whether consumers are going to be confused, but
the fact is that this is the law, it all comes down to the law of unfair
competition and these cases all turn off and on, on proof of bad
faith and copying. It’s what makes litigation, frankly, so
expensive. Because we’re all so busy trying to point fingers at one
another and show what evil characters our adversaries are.
MR. HOFFBERG:
Yes, but willful infringement can arise after a notice letter.
MR. MOSKIN:
Right.
MR. HOFFBERG:
It doesn’t have to predate the infringement?
MR. MOSKIN:
No, I’m not saying every case, it will—no, there certainly are
exceptions.
PROF. SCAFIDI:
Are there additional questions?
Up in the back. Thank you.
MS. WONG:
Good morning. Tzen Wong. It’s a question to Professor Afori,
somewhat inspired by Professor Scafidi’s reference to your work
on cultural rights as human rights. Just wondering, in your
opinion, do designers or design rights, have a place in the
discussion on cultural rights?
PROF. FISCHMAN AFORI:
Again, is the question whether designers have a cultural right?
MS. WONG:
229
See Justin P. Huddleson, Note, Objectively Reckless: A Semi-Imperical Evaluation
of In Re Seagate, 15 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 102, 102 (2009).
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Yes. Would they have a place in the discussion about cultural
rights?
PROF. GORDON:
Are you talking about things like indigenous designs in
Australia?
MS. WONG:
That would be one way of approaching it, but I was thinking
about it more broadly.
PROF. FISCHMAN AFORI:
Well, I think that even if they have a cultural right, it’s not
undermining, in any context, my proposal to have short-term
protection.
I mean, the cultural issue or the constitutional issue of human
rights is, I think, at another level. Maybe it has implication in the
scope of protection or in the exceptions and limitations.
PROF. SCAFIDI:
You’re thinking, perhaps, of their moral rights as well? Or no?
MS. WONG:
I’d love to hear the answer to that question.
PROF. FISCHMAN AFORI:
No, I think that designers should enjoy moral rights. I know
I’m going to be stoned here in the U.S., but I’m pro-moral rights.
In France, for example, designers are regarded as creators or
authors and there should be no discrimination between a designer
and a painter: all are “arts” and all should enjoy moral rights.230
But there is a question as to how to define the scope of protection
according to the subject matter; and a painting should be
distinguished from a hairbrush. There is no logic in protecting the

230

See Laura C. Marshall, Note, Catwalk Copycats: Why the Congress Should Adopt a
Modified Version of the Design Piracy Prohibition Act, 14 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 305, 319
(2007) (explaining that French copyright law has been extended to original fashion
designs and copyright holders receive moral rights the moment they create original
work).
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design of a hairbrush for life of the designer plus seventy years.231
It’s too much, hairbrushes should have no more than ten years.
Anyway, after two years, it’s a non-issue.
PROF. GORDON:
I’ve never been able to keep a hairbrush for ten years.
PROF. SCAFIDI:
In any case, are there any other questions?
Yes, down at the front?
MS. ASCHER:
I’d like to ask Professor Janis, you indicated a lot of areas
where you’re not really happy with design protection coming
through patent law.
Do you have a recommendation that would work, aside from
case-by-case litigation, actually, for cleaning it up? Would you
recommend a statute; an additional amendment? Or what would
your recommendation be to put some of these lawyers out of
work?
PROF. JANIS:
Oh, I would hope not to do that, at least if they’re lawyers
coming from my class in Indiana.
The simple way to answer it would be to say, oh, we should
have comprehensive design protection legislation and it should be
patterned after the legislation that we have in Europe.
We’ve tried and tried and tried and we’ve never been able to
accomplish that, so that leads me to ask a more pragmatic question,
so if we’re sticking with the regimes that we have, what kinds of
smaller reforms could be made, smaller reforms to the design
patent regime, assuming no movement in the trade dress regime.
I would say perhaps we need to make a statutory change, to
impose some other requirement other than obviousness. At the
very least, we need to change the rhetoric. It may be that the
analysis doesn’t turn out to be that much different, but to change
231
Copyright protection in the European Union exists for the life of the author plus
seventy years. Council Directive 93/98, art. 1, 1993 O.J. (L 290) 11 (EC).
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the rhetoric away from utility patent rhetoric, so we’re not talking
about obviousness anymore, we’re talking about individual
character, something else.
Similarly, a change in the law, by which we would not talk
about claims, to a patent lawyer, that just invites an element-byelement sort of analysis, a feature-by-feature kind of analysis, and I
think that’s been problematic in the area of design patents.
And certainly there’s a lot more work to be done, specifically
in the doctrine of functionality. There are all kinds of inconsistent
pronouncements—you have cases that say the standard is dictated
by functionality and at the same time say the standard is primarily
functional. The Federal Circuit has recited them back-to-back in
the same case.232 So the court has a role, too, in effectuating some
important reforms, even if we think of them as small-scale reforms.
PROF. FISCHMAN AFORI:
I just want to pop up with another answer to the question from
this direction. It’s a very good question and I think another
supplementary answer to the situation of non-copying similarities
is the court’s impulse to grant restitution or use similar doctrines
such as unfair competition, misappropriation, or unjust enrichment.
Such doctrines can be used as a supplementary answer to a
situation where there are similarities which are not made by
intentional copying. So it’s again, common law proposals, but I
think it works.
PROF. SCAFIDI:
Is there one other question?
MR. HOFFBERG:
If you move away from a patent style analysis of design
patents, how does the legal analysis of the design ever get
appealed?
PROF. JANIS:
How does it ever get appealed?
MR. HOFFBERG:

232

PHG Techs., LLC v. St. John Cos., 469 F.3d 1361, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
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Yes, without a judge going through word-by-word, elementby-element, describing what he’s thinking and what the design is
and what the prior art is and what the infringement is, how do you
ever get an appeal of a decision?
PROF. JANIS:
I don’t think there is a good answer to it, but you see it coming
up in trade dress law too. If we’re protecting the overall
appearance, there are a lot of different ways to define that. There
are ways to define it post-hoc, for litigation purposes, that would
seem troubling and objectionable. That could even happen under
the current regime of design patents, even though we act like the
scope of rights is a little more formally defined in advance, and we
have a claim. It certainly could happen in the less formal regime
that I’m talking about.
I think that that is a problem, but I think it’s endemic to the
area. That’s always going to be difficult in design, probably no
matter which type of regime that one uses.
MR. MOSKIN:
I mean, what your question called to mind is the standard of
review that’s often invoked in copyright cases, that if it’s simply a
pictorial or graphic thing, with courts, the appellate courts will say,
we are in as good of a position as the district courts to review that
picture or thing or culture, whatever it may be, for purposes of
appellate review.233
Nonetheless, although there is a certain amount of difference
that I think the cases now increasingly say, when the appellate
courts do that kind of analysis. But I think it always behooves the
litigant to do the best possible job of articulating what are those
elements, even if it’s not required.
I mean, in some cases, now in trade dress cases, it is becoming
required and in design patent cases—if you can’t tell the jury what
is so unique, or in the old days, what are the points of novelty,
you’re probably not going to win.
233

See, e.g., Esquire, Inc. v. Winger, 591 F.2d 796, 798 (D.C. Cir. 1978). The court of
appeals reversed the district court’s decision that an outdoor lighting fixture was eligible
for copyright protection as a “work of art.” See id.
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So again, I think it behooves litigants to do it anyway, even if
it’s not a requirement.
PROF. JANIS:
You also have to think about who’s the ordinary observer too,
for purposes of design patents. And that’s more complicated now,
after the Egyptian Goddess case. But that’s another place where a
litigant could do exactly what was being suggested. You could go
well beyond the minimal requirements of the law in articulating
who is the ordinary observer for purposes of your case.
I do think that the way that’s now defined, an ordinary observer
is a little less ordinary than it used to be and less like the appellate
judge than it used to be and that really creates the complication that
you’re talking about.
MR. MOSKIN:
And it’s also complicated by the fact that you’re not supposed
to use the commercial embodiment as the basis for assessing
infringement, but rather what’s claimed in the pictures.234 If the
person who drafted the design patent was attentive to some of the
things that you can do using phantom lines, so forth, it can be very
difficult to figure out, well, what am I supposed to show an
ordinary observer for him or her to define as the real element for
the purpose of making a comparison of some sort.
PROF. SCAFIDI:
All right. At this point, I have received the signal that only two
words can stand between you all and lunch and those words are
“thank you.”

234
See, e.g., Sun Hill Indus., Inc. v. Easter Unlimited, Inc., 48 F.3d 1193, 1196 (Fed.
Cir. 1995).

